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ABSTRACT 
 
Marital privilege to be or not to be that is the question? The origins of marital privilege dictate 
that it has been founded on the biblical principles of the sacredness of the union between man 
and wife. So holy is this union that wives could not betray their husbands as they would be 
betraying the God ordained marital union. As a result, wives were not competent or 
compellable witnesses against their husbands. Over the years the privilege has been developed 
in English common law where wives were declared to be competent and later non-compellable 
subject to exception only when an accused spouse has been charged with an offence that falls 
within a specific category. South Africa has adopted marital privilege from the English 
common law and has since codified it through the enactment of Section 198 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977. According to this section spouses cannot be compelled to testify 
against each other unless the crime for which the accused spouse is charged with appears in the 
categories listed in Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Act. This study examines the 
particular sections that pertain to spousal non-compellability. In so doing it highlights the 
development of the privilege in English common law and South Africa. There are many 
criticisms that are levied against affording a privilege to a particular class of persons.  The most 
prevailing argument is that the non-compellability exception given to spouses is 
unconstitutional because it violates the right to equality in terms of section 9 of the constitution. 
This study examines the merits of this argument and reaches the conclusion that spousal non-
compellability fails to withstand the test against unfair discrimination on the basis of marital 
status. It is a provision which fails to acknowledge the ever changing needs of a modern society 
in which we no longer have a one dimensional view of what may constitute a marital 
relationship. To this end the privilege does not take into account same sex couples, co-habitants 
and those persons that cannot get married legally. While it may be necessary for spouses and 
same sex couples to confide in each other without having to be fearful that their 
communications could be subject to testimony in court, to allow the privilege to remain in 
existence in its current form is to perpetuate unfair discrimination and inequality within our 
constitutional democracy. This creates an undesirable situation and therefore demands action 
in the form of reforming the privilege rather than a total abolishment of the exception. This 
study seeks to put forth recommendations in this regard by examining the nature, genesis and 
evolution of spousal competence and non-compellability in South African law. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
BACKGROUND 
 
1.1. Introduction  
 
“Sprang from the canons of medieval jurisprudence: the concept that husband and wife were one, and 
that since the woman had no recognized separate legal existence, the husband was that one. From that 
doctrine, it followed that what was inadmissible from the lips of the defendant-husband was also 
inadmissible from his wife”1  
Marital privilege or the non-compellability exception afforded to spouses as described in the 
abovementioned quotation finds expression within the ambit of South African common law 
and in section 198 of the Criminal Procedure Act (hereinafter referred to as the CPA).2 
According to the principles that underlie the privilege, a spouse, although a competent witness, 
is not compellable unless the crime falls within a specific category.3 Spouses therefore are the 
only category of witnesses who are afforded a privilege that permits them to refuse to disclose 
to the court evidence that is both admissible and highly relevant in criminal proceedings.  
 
In line with the general principles of evidence as it relates to competence and compellability 
Cowen and Carter4 provide the following explanation: 
 
“A competent witness is a person whom the law allows a party to ask, but not compel, to give evidence. 
A compellable witness is a person whom the law allows a party to compel to give evidence. There are 
certain questions that a witness may refuse to answer if he so wishes. He is said to be privileged in 
respect of those questions.” 
  
                                                          
1 Trammel v. United States (1980) 445 U.S. 40, 44. 
2 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
3 Ibid see section 195(1)(a)-(i) of the. Offences committed against the person of either of the spouses or of a child 
of either of them. Included are the offences of bigamy, incest and abduction, and certain offences in terms of the 
Child Care Act 74 of 1983, the Maintenance Act 99 of 1998 and the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957. 
4 Cowen and Carter, Essays on the law of Evidence, (1956) 220. 
 2 
In amplification of the above it is clear therefore that a competent witness is one who is deemed 
fit to adduce evidence.5 A compellable witness is one who may be forced to adduce evidence 
and privilege refers to a concession afforded to a witness to refuse to adduce evidence.6 
 
While it may be argued that privilege is necessitated by the need to offer protection to certain 
categories of persons, a right or a public interest,7 the point of contention arises when the 
existence of such a privilege impacts negatively on the court’s fact-finding in that it confers a 
benefit to a particular group of persons at the exclusion of others.8  
 
The term ‘marriage’ as understood in the law of evidence includes customary marriages and 
marital unions.9 The primary objective of the privilege remains the protection of marital 
confidentiality in order to promote and preserve the marital relationship.10 As the quote in the 
beginning of this chapter suggests the privilege finds its roots deeply entrenched in medieval 
jurisprudence. Arguably it does not take into account factors such as the following: the current 
modern definitions of relationships which fall outside the confines of a legal marriage; public 
policy which demands that a court of law has access to all the relevant evidence to ensure that 
those who are guilty of a crime are convicted; and perhaps most importantly the constitutional 
right to equality.11  
 
The consequence has been that the justification of this archaic concept, once firmly embedded 
within criminal procedure, has in recent times become increasingly difficult to uphold. Some 
commentators argue that a continuance of the privilege would be a perpetuation of unfair 
discrimination.12 These rights are enshrined in the Constitution and any “law or conduct” that 
is in violation should be disregarded.13 The crux of these arguments is that the privilege does 
                                                          
5 Lusty David, ‘Is There A Common Law Privilege Against Spouse-Incrimination? ‘2004, 27 UNSWLJ 1. 
6 Ibid.  
7 Supra note 4. 
8 BC Naude, ‘Spousal competence and compell-ability to testify: A reconsideration’ (2004). SACJ. 
9 Section 195(2) of the Act. 
10 Supra note 8. 
11 Abdool Delano. ‘Section 198 of the criminal Procedure Act: Marital privilege or unfair discrimination on the 
ground of marital status?’ (2004). De Rebus. 
12 Ibid.  
13 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 Section 2.  
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not extend to couples who are co-habitants and life partners, and fails to consider relationships 
that do not conform to the conventional notion of a legal marriage.14 The counter argument is 
that a spouse also enjoys the right to privacy which will be undermined should the privilege be 
removed from South African law.15 The questions to be considered in light of these arguments 
are therefore whether the right to marital privilege outweighs the right to equality and whether 
the interest in protecting the marital union is more relevant than the interests of justice. 
 
This dissertation seeks to initiate the debate as to whether this age-old privilege can continue 
to find relevance in the context of a post constitutional democracy. The research undertakes to 
analyse the intricacies of the legal principles that uphold the foundations of the privilege both 
in common law and in statute. In addition, the study will also explore three fundamental 
questions, the first why are spouses deserving of a higher degree of protection as compared to 
all other category of witnesses? The second, does public policy dictate that communications 
made during a marriage must remain inviolable and is it necessary to distinguish marital 
relationships from other unions for the purpose of compellability? 
 
The debate surrounding marital privilege is not unique to South African law and yet 
surprisingly not even foreign jurisdictions have been able to provide a conclusive resolution 
regarding the viability of the privilege. Countries such as Australia have abolished the privilege 
from its legal system altogether by stating that the privilege did not form part of the common 
law and thus was not deserving of a place within Australian law.16 This may not be the ideal 
solution for South Africa as will be discussed under recommendations in chapter 5 of this study. 
In the 20th century, law commissions in South Africa17 much like the United Kingdom have 
made efforts to consider the relevance of the privilege however these commissions have not 
been decisive on any specific reform. Thus, the privilege remains unchanged causing this area 
of the law to remain an issue for future deliberation. In the face of mounting pressure to give 
force and effect to the rights embedded in the constitution there is a pressing need to examine 
the constitutionality of marital privilege. This cannot be done without instructive and 
comprehensive research on guiding authority and commentary in South Africa and abroad. 
                                                          
14 Supra note 8. 
15Ibid. 
16 Australian Crime Commission and Louise Stoddart, b71 of 2010. 
17 South African Law Commission, Issue Paper 26(Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence, 2008. 
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1.2 A Brief Overview of the History of Marital Privilege. 
Marital communications are protected within law. Evidence of this can be found first as 
opposed to any other evidence in section 3 of the Evidence Amendment Act of 1853.18  This 
section provided that: 
 
“No husband shall be compellable to disclose any communication made to him by his wife during the 
marriage, and no wife shall be compellable to disclose any communication made to her by her husband 
during the marriage.”19 
 
Origins of this theory date back to the bible and continued through to medieval ecclesiastical 
law.20 According to the prevailing views of the day in allegiance with the spiritual norms and 
customs, spouses were deemed to be a singular entity that were spiritually ordained.21 
Husbands and wives were therefore regarded as one.22 This formed the basic premise of the 
common law and reinforced the patriarchal notion that underpinned the values of society, that 
a husband was the only legally recognised person in the marital union, and therefore the marital 
privilege would practically serve only to protect a husband who was charged with an offence.23 
 
In accordance with English common law an accused could not give evidence in support of his 
own case because he was presumed to have a vested interest in the proceeding.24 The spiritual 
context within which a married couple was viewed guaranteed that a wife would be silent.25 
The very prospect that a wife may betray her husband and as a result thereof the future of the 
marriage may be compromised led to the understanding that the immunity given to spouses 
was in fact actually affording an accused spouse protection against self-incrimination.26  
                                                          
18 Evidence Amendment Act of 1853, s3. 
19 Ibid.  
20 Supra note 5. 
21 GA Barton; The competence and compellability of spouses to give evidence in criminal proceedings and the 
confidentiality of marital communications (LLM thesis, UNISA, 1977). 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid.  
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
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It is this theory that formed the basis of marital privilege that persisted for centuries.27 The 
theory started to erode as wives began to emerge with their own separate legal identity that 
allowed them rights in property and to enter into contractual relationships.28 It then became 
apparent that the purpose of marital privilege was slowly departing from the protection of the 
husband as the accused spouse to a social interest in ensuring that the marital relationship was 
protected.29 In as early as 1933 American courts regarded wives as competent witnesses in 
defence of their husbands but not against them.30 
 
In South Africa a spouse lacked competence and compellability in criminal proceedings for the 
defence or prosecution.31 The CPA32 was the first sign of reform with regard to spousal 
competence, in which spouses were deemed to be competent and compellable for the defence. 
Spouses were only declared to be competent and non-compellable for prosecution in 1988 
when section 195 and section 196 of the CPA33 were amended by subsection 6 and 7 of the 
Law of Evidence Amendment Act34 resulting in spouses becoming competent witnesses 
although not compellable unless the crime in question falls within a specific category.35  
 
1.3. LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
1.3.1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa36 
 
The most compelling reason for a reconsideration of marital privilege can be found in the 
Constitution.37 In determining whether marital privilege violates the constitution one must give 
consideration to section 39(1) of the Constitution,38 which states: 
                                                          
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid.  
31 Ibid. 
32 Supra note 2. 
33Ibid. 
34 Act 45 of 1988. 
35 Supra note 2 at section 195. 
36 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 (1996 Constitution). 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
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“When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum (a) must promote the values that 
underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom; (b)…..(c) may 
consider foreign law.” 
 
To determine whether section 198 of the CPA39 violates the right to equality, section 9 of the 
constitution40 must be examined. The fact that the privilege only recognises relationships that 
are valid in law perpetuates unfair discrimination upon those that have sought to be in 
relationships that are not or cannot be valid in law.41 Marital status is a specified ground in 
section 9(3) of the constitution42 expounding that one may not be discriminated against on this 
basis.43 
 
In Harksen v Lane44 the Constitutional Court set out the stages of an inquiry that needs to be 
undertaken to determine whether the right to equality has been violated. A discussion of this 
inquiry will be examined in greater detail in chapter 3 of this study. 
 
In addition to protecting the right to equality, the Constitution45 also recognises that spouses, 
like other category of witnesses are deserving of the right to privacy.46 It may be argued that 
                                                          
39 Supra note 2. 
40 Section 9 (the `equality clause', as it is known) of the Bill of Rights states: 
  “(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.” 
   “(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote 
 the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or 
categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.” 
“(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, 
including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, 
age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.” 
“(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in terms 
of subsection.”  
“(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that          
the discrimination is fair.” 
41 Supra note 8. 
42 Supra note 36. 
43 Supra note 11. 
44 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC). 
45 Supra note 36. 
46 Supra note 8. 
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such a right may be limited by section 36 of the Constitution.47 However marital 
communications are regarded as privileged, section 14 (d) of the Constitution48 provides that 
every person has a right against the infringement of his or her private communications.49 
Therefore the question that emanates is by affording married persons a separate privilege from 
testifying, are we saying that the right to privacy supercedes the right to equality? This will be 
discussed further in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
 
1.3.2 The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
 
The current rules governing marital privilege in South Africa is contained in section 195 to 
section 199 of the CPA.50 The provisions of section 196 (1) of the CPA51 renders the spouse a 
competent but non-compellable witness for the defence.52 According to section 198 of the 
CPA53 a spouse may claim marital privilege and refuse to disclose any communication made 
during the subsistence of the marriage.54 The exception can be found in a category of offences 
contained in section 195 of the CPA55 in which a spouse becomes compellable in respect of 
any of the offences listed under this section. This privilege is not applicable to spouses in civil 
matters as they are regarded as both competent and compellable and may be called to testify 
on behalf of the accused spouse and against such spouse.56 
 
The holder of the privilege remains the testifying spouse and the accused spouse cannot prevent 
such communication from being disclosed. 57 This appears to be a diversion from the general 
principles attached to other privileges. The notable difference is that in all other privileges it is 
the person for whom the benefit exists that is the holder of the privilege stemming from the 
                                                          
47 Supra note 11. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Supra note 8. 
50 Supra note 2. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Supra note 21.  
53 Supra note 2. 
54 Supra note 21.       
55 Supra note 2 at section 195. 
56 The Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965. 
57 Supra note 8. 
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fact that it is that person’s communication that deserves some sort of protection.58 By affording 
the testifying spouse, the right of holder of the privilege, there is no protection afforded to the 
accused spouse as he or she has no ability to control whether the communication is divulged 
and to what extent because no consent is required from the accused spouse.59 
 
Section 199 of the CPA60 does provide that a testifying spouse may decline to respond to a 
question if the accused spouse would have not been compelled to answer that same question.61 
But again the choice remains with the testifying spouse who may still decide to testify leaving 
the spouse who made the communication susceptible. Even a third person that hears or 
intercepts the communication cannot be prevented from disclosing it.62 This displays that the 
purpose of the privilege is not concerned with the protection of the spouse but rather the marital 
relationship.63 
 
As was alluded to in the previous paragraph if the main purpose of the privilege is the protection 
of the marital relationship and not the accused spouse than it is quite interesting that the 
privilege persists after divorce. The extension of the privilege after divorce is therefore illogical 
if the relationship has since been terminated, simply because any disclosure once the marital 
union has ended will not cause any harm to the marriage or threaten the way the ex-spouses 
continue to exchange confidences with each other.64 The privilege only extends to 
communications made during the subsistence of the marriage and widows and widowers 
remain excluded.65 It is submitted in agreement with the view advanced by Naude66 that the 
privilege should only be afforded in terms of marital status at the time that the witness is 
required to testify and not at the time when the communication was made.67 
                                                          
58 Ibid 
59 Ibid. 
60 Supra note 2 above. 
61 See s 199 of the Act and s 12 of the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965.  
62 Supra note 8. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Supra note 8. 
65 Section 198(2) of the Act and s 10(2) of the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965. The privilege applies 
even if the communication was not made in confidence, as long as it was made while the spouses were still 
married: SJ van Niekerk, SE van der Merwe and AJ van Wyk Privilegies in die Bewysreg (1984) 192. 
66 Supra note 8. 
67 Ibid. 
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Marital privilege is intriguing and has piqued the writers’ interest. It reflects a modern debate 
on whether society’s interest in protecting the sanctity of marriage should outweigh its interest 
in ensuring that the court is able to arrive at a proper judgement by placing all the relevant facts 
before it, particularly testimony of spouses which may be highly relevant and yet would 
otherwise be protected by the privilege. The justification for the continued existence of the 
privilege remains that should a spouse be compelled to testify against the other spouse it would 
place undue stress and strain on the relationship and could ultimately lead to a breakdown of 
the marriage. It is argued however that this justification may not hold much weight against the 
effect and outcome of the privilege which essentially continues to perpetuate a violation of the 
constitution through unfair discrimination and inequality on the basis of marital status. These 
points of criticism coupled with the fact that the privilege places the importance of preserving 
a marital union over the interests of the court having all the evidence before it is certainly cause 
for further inspection into the law governing marital privilege. 
 
1.4. CASE LAW 
 
In a discussion of the common law position and legal framework on marital privilege it is 
important to undertake an analysis of some judicial precedents that have adopted and 
interpreted the principles of marital privilege in South African law. 
 
There is yet to be a case before South African courts that challenge the constitutionality of 
marital privilege. A study of case law related to marriage privilege deals with the legal 
principles that enforce the privilege and has certainly resulted in development of the privilege. 
Some of these cases will be discussed briefly. 
 
1.4.1 English Case law 
 
Marital privilege has been considered in two primary cases in English courts that deal with 
spousal non-compellability, these were the cases of Leach v The King68 and Hoskyn v 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner. 69 In the former case the court stated that the non-
compellability of a spouse has existed since the foundations of the common law. 
                                                          
68 1912 AC 305. 
69 1979 AC 474. 
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In Hoskyn, 70 the court rejected the notion that a spouse is compellable when he or she is a 
victim of inter domestic violence and held that it was a fundamental principle that spouses 
should not be compelled to testify against each other in criminal cases, even when they were 
fully competent to do so. 
 
1.4.2 American Case Law 
 
Trammel v United States71 is the seminal judgement on marital privilege by the Supreme Court 
in America. This case eliminated the right of the accused spouse, that allowed that spouse to 
prevent a witness spouse from giving evidence incriminating the accused spouse and confirmed 
that the witness spouse has a privilege to refuse to disclose such evidence. 
 
1.4.3 South African Case Law 
 
Prior to the enactment of the CPA72 the general principle that spouses were incompetent 
witnesses in criminal proceeding came under severe judicial criticism and scrutiny. This is 
clearly reflected in the cases of, R v Jamba73  S v Khanyapa74. In the case of S v Mgcwabe75 
the court held that, 
 
 “Section 195(1) of the CPA does not provide that a spouse shall not be compellable to give evidence 
only if this is necessary to preserve the marriage relationship. It affords such spouse an absolute right 
to make an election not to testify. If a spouse refuses to testify because that spouse does not wish to go 
to court, despite feeling nothing for his or her partner, this cannot have the effect of making such spouse 
a compellable witness for the prosecution.  s195 (1) gives the spouse an absolute right to make an 
election not to testify; it does not provide that a spouse shall not be compellable to give evidence 'only 
if this is necessary to preserve the marriage relationship.”76 
 
                                                          
70 Ibid. 
71 445 US 40 (1980). 
72 Supra note 2. 
73 1947 (4) SA 228 (C). 
741979 (1) SA 824 (A) at 835D–F.  
75 2015 (2) SACR 517 (ECG) Paragraph [12] at 522d. 
76 Ibid. 
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A marriage entered into for ulterior purposes does not ordinarily affect its validity for the 
purpose of section 195(1) of the CPA77. In S v Leepile & others78 a marriage entered into during 
an adjournment in proceedings under section 189 (1) of the CPA79 was held to be valid for the 
purposes of section 195 (1)80 even though the motive of the parties in entering into the marriage 
was to afford the witness a 'just excuse' for refusing to answer questions put to her in terms of 
section 189 (1) of the CPA81. It was held, further, in S v Louw82 that the fact that the accused 
intended to marry an essential state witness before the commencement of the trial, and that the 
witness would become non-compellable in terms of section 195 of the CPA,83 was not a 
justifiable reason for refusing to grant the accused bail. The court further held that section 195 
of the CPA84 was possibly unconstitutional.85 
 
In S v Vengetsamy86  a woman, married in accordance with Hindu rites, was regarded as a non-
compellable witness for the prosecution against her husband on the ground that the marriage 
was a monogamous union. The court in S v Johardien87  however, was of the view that the 
decision in Vengetsamy88 was incorrect and did not follow it.  
 
1.5. INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE AUTHORITY 
 
A comparative study on the law in foreign jurisdictions as it relates to the non-compellability 
privilege afforded to spouses will provide greater insight into how the privilege could be 
considered in the future in South African law either through the reformation or the elimination 
of the privilege. The foreign jurisdiction that will be analysed is the United States of America.  
 
                                                          
77 Supra note 2. 
78 (3)  1986 (2) SA 352 (W). 
79 Supra note 2. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 2000 (2) SACR 714 (T). 
83 Supra note 2. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Supra note 82 at pg716 par F. 
86 1972 (4) SA 351 (D). 
87 1990 (1) SA 1026 (C). 
88 Supra note 86 above. 
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The United States of America much like South Africa recognises the existence of the non-
compellability privilege afforded to spouses. The notable difference is that the United States of 
America affords much greater protection to marital communications.  
 
The reasons for the posture adopted in America would prove useful to South African 
lawmakers in the determination of the future of the non-compellability exception of spouses in 
our law.  
 
1.5.1 United States of America 
 
While the United States of America have followed the same common law principle as both 
England and South Africa the former has chosen to adopt a slightly different approach to the 
privilege. The United States have codified marital privilege in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
Rule 501.89 
The interpretation afforded by the courts in respect of the privilege is that the privilege shall be 
governed by common law unless it is provided for in the United States constitution, a Federal 
Statute or the rules of the Supreme Court.90 This view is different in civil law where it is left to 
state law to govern the privilege.91 
There are certainly features in American law that are efficacious in the regulation of marital 
privilege these are useful mechanisms in assessing the current legislation that are applicable to 
marital privilege in South Africa. A brief discussion of such tools will be discussed further in 
this dissertation. 
 
1.6. AIM OF THE STUDY  
 
The aim of this dissertation is to analyse marital privilege as set out in section 198 of the CPA92 
in order to determine its constitutionality and find a mechanism for facilitating a principled and 
consistent exercise of the privilege in South African law for the future. 
                                                          
89 Katherine 0. Eldredt ‘Every Spouse's Evidence’: Availability of the Adverse Spousal Testimonial Privilege in       
Federal Civil Trials, The University of Chicago Law Review. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Supra note 2. 
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1.7. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND RATIONALE OF THE STUDY 
  
The specific objectives of the study are to: 
• Discuss the history and application of marital privilege; 
• Discuss the current SA legal framework and case law pertaining to marital privilege; 
• Discuss the constitutionality of marital privilege. 
• Comparatively analyse and examine marital privilege in the United States of America. 
• Propose recommendations. 
The rationale of this study is to determine if marital privilege afforded to spouses: 
1. Is consistent with the right to equality? 
2. Is deserving of protection in terms of the right to privacy? 
3. Amounts to unfair discrimination based on marital status? 
These remain central considerations that are fundamental in determining the constitutionality 
of marital privilege. 
 
1.8. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The main justification for the existence of marital privilege remains the protection of the 
institution of marriage founded on the belief that this union was the cornerstone of our society. 
Naude submits that the justification is baseless and that the effect of such a privilege leaves 
much to be desired.93 He further advances the view that in the context of a modern society the 
privilege lacks constitutional muster in its failure to recognize other conventional relationships 
that may arise within the family component.94  
As Naude suggests the underlying consideration for the justification is that spouses must be 
able to communicate with each other freely and in total confidence without fear of interference 
or intervention from the law.95 He further argues however that marital confidence is not 
dependent on the existence of a marital privilege and the fact that the spouse has knowledge of 
                                                          
93 Supra note 8. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
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the existence of the marital privilege cannot be said to encourage him or her to take their spouse 
into greater confidence or on the other hand not take his or her spouse into confidence at all.96 
Heydon97 supports Naudes98 view and advances that most people are not aware of the rules 
applicable to marital privilege in the first place or that such a privilege is in existence at all thus 
any argument that the marital privilege promotes or protects trust in a marriage cannot be 
sustained. 
Sopinka, Lederman and Bryant99 point out that a marriage from its inception is formed out of 
a trust relationship and it is this that leads to open and transparent communication between the 
spouses not the fact that there is a marital privilege in existence for their protection. They 
further point out that the absence of a marital privilege is likely to have little or no effect on 
the way spouses confide in each other.100 Thus, the justification of the existence of the privilege 
on the premise that it protects the trust relationship deserves more attention particularly as the 
confidence may still be breached at any time by the testifying spouse as he or she remains the 
holder of the right and there is no guarantee that he or she will invoke the protection of marital 
privilege.101 
Perhaps the most important justification in respect of marital privilege remains the argument 
that spouses deserve such protection in terms of the right to privacy. Naude submits that the 
right to privacy pales in comparison to other constitutional rights that the marital privilege fails 
to consider.102 He further advances that when one analyses the inconsistent situation that arises 
because of the privilege the arguments in support of the spouses right to privacy remains 
uncompelling.103   
Naude104 gives an example of such an anomalous situation by pointing out that a spouse who 
witnesses a murderous act by the other spouse may be forced to give evidence related to such 
but if that spouse does not witness the actual murder but is the recipient of an admission about 
                                                          
96 Ibid. 
97 JD Heydon ‘Legal Professional Privilege and Third Parties (1974) 37 MLR 601.  
98 Supra note 8. 
99 J Sopinka, SN Lederman and AW Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada (1992) 690.  
100 Ibid. 
101 Supra note 8. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Supra note 8 at pg. 331. 
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the commission of the murder that spouse cannot be forced to testify. Despite pointing out the 
weaknesses in relying on the right to privacy to justify marital privilege, Naude105 goes on to 
suggest as part of his recommendations that the court must not discard the right totally and that 
it should be taken into consideration when the court uses its discretion to determine whether 
there is a need for spousal testimony or not. Naude106 states that policy considerations inform 
the marital privilege and questions whether marriages are deserving of the high valued status 
it has been afforded through such a privilege. 
It is trite in our law that the holder of the marital privilege is the spouse to whom a 
communication is made. Many have argued that this principle governing the privilege is a 
deviation from the normal principles pertaining to other privileges without plausible reason. 
Naude points out the difference in that the holder of the privilege is the only person who can 
consent to the information being divulged and the holder is usually the person who will derive 
a benefit from the existence of such a privilege thus flowing from this it would normally be 
that person’s interest which is protected by the privilege.107 
McNicol108 holds the view as is highlighted by Naude109 that one could follow either of the two 
former options, both authors agree that either the holder of the right should be the spouse 
making the communication and whose interest may be deserving of protection or that the 
holders of the privilege should be both spouses jointly and thus should one favour the latter 
option, the privilege would only be waived by mutual consent of both spouses. Unsurprisingly 
both Mcnicol110 and Naude111 then conclude on this point by advancing that they do not favour 
the current position in our law that the holder of the marital privilege is only the spouse who is 
the receiver of the communication. Naudes’112 main contention in this regard is that it is 
illogical and falls out of the prevailing principles that govern other privileges in the law of 
evidence.  
                                                          
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Supra note 8. 
108 SB McNicol Law of Privilege (1992). 
109 Supra note 8. 
110 Supra note 108. 
111 Supra note 8. 
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Mcnicol113 provides a basis for his stance by stating that the object of having a privilege in the 
first place is defeated in that it is meant to serve as a guard for the person who has made such 
communication, in marital privilege where the holder of the privilege is not the person who 
made such communication that spouse remains unprotected. The argument that the privilege 
exists to protect the marriage and not the spouse who made the communication therefore that 
spouse is not the holder of such right, does not hold much weight.114 It appears that should a 
spouse choose to waive the marital privilege and testify against the other spouse than the 
marriage is at a greater risk of destruction plagued by the feeling of betrayal and anger towards 
the spouse who testified against the other out of choice. It is suggested that it would serve to 
protect the marriage better if the holder of the right was in fact the spouse who made the 
communication as that spouse could choose to waive the privilege of his or her own accord 
thus not leaving the other spouse vulnerable to rejection should he or she decide to testify and 
further to that not wanting to testify at all due to fear of reprisal. 
According to our law, marital privilege can also be invoked by divorced persons but is only 
applicable to communications made during the subsistence of the marriage.115 Naude argues 
that there is no reason why the privilege should be extended to persons that are no longer 
married.116 There is no longer the risk that the marriage relationship will be harmed. He states 
that the way spouses confide in each other during the marriage will not be affected in any way 
should they not be afforded the protection of the privilege once they divorce.117 Naude also 
makes an important point for consideration that the test that should be applied by our law to 
determine marital status, should be at the time that the evidence is given as opposed to the date 
that the communication was made.118 
There are offences for which spouses are compelled to testify and may not be allowed to invoke 
the benefit of the privilege.119 Naude suggests that this list of specified offences that form part 
of a specific category is justified by the ‘removal of choice’ argument.120 
                                                          
113 Supra note 108. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Supra note 8. 
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118 Ibid. 
119 Supra note 8 at pg. 332. 
120 Ibid. 
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 Zuckermann121 states that in allowing the prosecution the ability to compel a spouse to testify 
for certain offences it avoids the other spouse from exerting undue pressure and influence over 
the testifying spouse in order to avoid being found guilty and therefore maintains harmony 
within the marital home. The question as to whether this outcome is achieved is a further point 
for discussion. 
There are many other reasons that have been advanced as to need for the creation of a specific 
category of offences that have been excluded from the protection of the marital privilege. 
Naude presents the notion that the public interest would be better served by having a list of 
offences that must be prosecuted as opposed to advancing non-compellability of spouses in 
relation to all crimes as a blanket privilege that one can invoke in respect of any or all 
offences.122 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe remind us that the basis of the privilege since its 
inception has been the protection of a marriage but when one considers the offences contained 
in the list most of which are directly reacted to the spouse or their children this notion struggles 
to hold its weight.123 Naude124 submits that both the abovementioned arguments are deserving 
of merit but when one considers the exclusion of specified offences from the privilege one must 
also give due consideration to the challenges associated with it. 
The most notable criticism appears to be in section 195 of the CPA 125 which fails to make 
provision for some serious and prevalent offences such as murder.126 This is problematic in 
that a spouse of an accused spouse who has committed murder may not be compelled to testify 
against that spouse. Another area of concern, as Schwikkard and Van Der Merwe127 highlight 
is in the interpretation of the wording ‘offence against the person’. They point out that the 
courts have adopted a rather restrictive approach to the meaning of this phrase thereby 
confining it to the offences of assault and state that they doubt whether this is in accordance 
with the original intent of the legislators and further suggest that there remains no reason to not 
                                                          
121 Aas Zuckerman Principles of evidence (1989) 290.  
122 Supra note 8. 
123 PJ Schwikkard and SE van der Merwe, Principles of Evidence 2ed (2002) 142. 
124 Supra note 8 at pg. 332. 
125 Supra note 2. 
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127 Supra note 123 para 10.6 
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include offences that cause injury to one’s personality such as crimen iniuria under the ambit 
of this section.128 
The other criticism that is noteworthy is the obvious conundrum that may occur when a spouse 
is charged with an array of offences at the same time some of which are exempted as per the 
list and other offences that are not. This would result in the spouse being compelled to testify 
on some charges and not compellable on other charges. While Naude suggests that this situation 
could be dissolved by a separation of trials or with a withdrawal of the non-compellability 
charges he does point out that where the charges are formulated on the same evidence this may 
be unfeasible due to time and the costs involved as well as causing possible undue benefit to 
the prosecution.129 
The most important reason for an analysis of marital privilege and a revision of our laws in this 
regard can be found in the Constitution. As Naude130 states by affording only persons that are 
“party to a marriage that is recognized and valid in law and not beyond that” protection from 
testifying against each other, the privilege implicates the right to equality. This issue needs to 
be examined in greater detail to determine whether the differentiation between different 
categories of partnerships and marriage for purposes of compellability is justified. 
Naude states that one cannot take a restrictive approach to the concept of relationships in that 
it may only be worthy of protection if it is reduced to the legal standing of a marriage.131 He 
argues that the concept of family cannot be placed into a vacuum of what may constitute an 
acceptable family model.132 This goes far beyond the notion of a marriage but includes the 
values it is based on and the purposes attached to it.133 
In addition any constitutional enquiry involving marital privilege must bear reference to 
whether the privilege in light of the provisions of section 198 of the CPA134 justifiably limits 
the right to equality.135 Madala J pointed out in Satchwell v President of the Republic136 that 
                                                          
128 Ibid. 
129 Supra note 8 at pg. 333 
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134 Supra note 2. 
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136 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) at para 41. 
 19 
equality for all South Africans is a theme that runs rampant throughout the Constitution. The 
test for violation of the right to equality was set out in Harksen v Lane137 and the approach 
adopted by the court in Harksen138 was subsequently confirmed by many other cases.139 
Naude140 argues that if one were to apply the two-stage inquiry as set out in the abovementioned 
case the results will yield that marital privilege as contained in the provisions of section 198 of 
the CPA141 is discriminatory in so far as it relates to marital status and sexual orientation. The 
latter two grounds are listed in section 9(3) of the constitution142 which means one may presume 
unfairness however one would still have to prove unfairness. Naude states that in doing so one 
has to conduct an analysis of what makes discrimination unfair.143 
In consideration of the above Naude144 highlights that the provisions that give effect to marital 
privilege differentiates between married people and unmarried couples and by granting certain 
rights only to married people they discriminate against those that are unable to marry or choose 
not to. He further concludes that the basis of the privilege is the preservation of the marriage 
but by excluding people who have not entered into a marriage it is suggesting that such 
relationships are not worthy of recognition or respect and do not constitute a family.145 Naude 
brings his argument in this regard to an end with a proposition that an extension of the privilege 
to persons who are in relationships but not married will in no way undermine the traditional 
institution of marriage stating explicitly that section 198 of the CPA146 is “irrational and 
unjustifiable.”147 
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1. 9. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This dissertation will be a desktop review of the applicable legal material.  
Some of the international instruments and legislation to be analyzed includes the following:   
• The Constitution of South Africa, Act 106 of 1996.148  
• Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.149 
• The Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988.150 
• Civil Proceedings Evidence Act.151 
The research will also make use of secondary sources to support the researchers and sources 
above. Secondary sources include Books, Journals, Peer-Reviewed Articles, Online Academic 
Research Papers and Critical and Evaluative works on the primary data. 
The Internet will be used in the collection of information using search engines such as Google 
Scholar, Lexis Nexis, Act Online and Hein Online.  
 
1.10 CHAPTER BREAKDOWN 
 
Chapter One: Introduction  
Chapter one of this research paper sets out the background for the study as well as provides an 
introduction on marital privilege. The chapter provides the research questions, aims and 
objectives, literature review and an explanation of the research type and methodology. 
Chapter Two: The history and development of Marital Privilege 
This chapter will provide an overview of the concept of marital privilege. It will trace the 
origins and development of marital privilege and the early stages of how the law in South 
Africa approached and developed marital privilege.\ 
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Chapter Three: Legislative framework and the constitutionality of section 198 of the CPA 
This chapter will examine the constitutionality of the rules underpinning marital privilege. In 
so doing the chapter will include a critical analysis of the right to privacy as it relates to spousal 
communications and whether this right sufficiently justifies the continued existence of a marital 
privilege. The chapter will also focus on the right to equality and determine whether this right 
has been infringed by the provision of section 198 of the CPA152. Both rights will be weighed 
against each other to determine the constitutionality of marital privilege. 
Chapter Four: Foreign legal systems  
Marital privilege appears to have its origins in international legal systems it would therefore be 
of great interest to explore the key aspects of the privilege and the current principles that 
underpin the operation of the privilege in foreign jurisdictions. This chapter will consist of a 
comparative analysis of authorities on marital privilege from the legal systems of the United 
States of America in whose jurisdiction marital privilege remains solidified, much like South 
Africa. An analysis of these legal systems would be beneficial to South Africa as it would 
provide practicable solutions for possible reform. 
 Chapter Five: Conclusion and Recommendations  
The final chapter of this study will draw conclusions from the research and make 
recommendations. The chapter would seek to highlight the importance of achieving a 
proportionate balance between the interests of justice, society, the individual and the 
constitution. 153 
1.11 Conclusion 
In conclusion there is certainly a compelling argument for lawmakers to review the current 
principles of marital privilege. The question still remains as to the development that is needed 
and the type of reform that should be undertaken. This necessitates the need for research to be 
conducted in this area of the law with a view of dissecting pertinent issues such as the purpose 
of section 198 of the CPA154 in dealing with spousal testimony, the constitutional right of 
privacy and the right to equality with a view of proposing possible recommendations. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF MARITAL PRIVILEGE 
 
2.1 Introduction  
While the exact origins of marital privilege may be debatable, the fundamental principles it 
encompasses are undoubtedly, deeply rooted in English common law.155 Stemming from an 
ancient ideology that wives are not compelled to give evidence regarding their husband’s 
criminal activities because they remain bound in terms of the marital relationship.156 
The common law underpins the rules that relate to spousal competence and non-
compellability.157 The privilege has retained its relevance through biblical and medieval 
ecclesiastical law and has evolved over the centuries from the time of Lord Coke in 1628 to its 
current form in the CPA158. This chapter entails a discussion on the origins of the privilege and 
traces its development in South African law. 
 
2.2 The origins of marital privilege 
Marital privilege can be traced back to divine law.159 The privilege is rooted within a biblical 
context stemming from the notion that a man and women once united in matrimony are 
regarded as one flesh.160 Their unity and loyalty to each other remained of utmost importance 
because marriage was ordained by God and therefore no man should be allowed to put this 
asunder and certainly not through betraying the other.161 The above notion provides an 
explanation as to the need in common law for the special protection afforded to spouses to 
maintain the sanctity of the marriage because it was a relationship that was sacred in the eyes 
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of God. Remnants of this ideal forms the basis of the justification for spousal non-
compellability even today.162 
The Bible also clearly defined the role of a wife which was to serve, obey and be submissive 
to their husbands in every respect.163 This often-forced women into a difficult position where 
they were expected to remain within their defined roles as demanded in the Bible and preached 
by the church but faced a moral issue when they became aware that their husbands were 
involved in the commission of a crime. 164 
 
2.3 English common law 
In response to this dilemma the principle that wives were not bound to divulge information 
related to the crimes that their husbands may have committed developed within common 
law.165 
The common law rule went on to be further developed by King Ine of West Saxon166 and King 
Canute167 in a show of sympathy to wives whose husbands had committed crimes.168 Both of 
these kings reinforced spousal non-compellability clearly to give credence to the relationship 
between husband and wife as defined in the bible which outlined that wives were to be obedient 
to their husbands and ensure harmony within the matrimonial home at all costs.169 
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There were four widely recognised common law rules that governed marital privilege at the 
time.170 The first being that neither spouse was competent to testify on behalf of each other.171 
Secondly that  a spouse could not be compellable when it would result in self-incrimination, 
the third rule was that the spouse was incompetent when required to testify against the accused 
spouse and the final rule was that the communications subject to a marriage were protected 
from being disclosed.172 
The work of Michael Dalton titled ‘The Countrey of Justice’ in 1618173 is said to be the first 
authority that formally set out a description of the English common law rules of marital 
privilege.  
The rule described by Dalton174 only afforded marital privilege to a wife and not a husband. In 
addition, it did not assert that wives were incompetent witnesses if they were called to testify 
in support of their husbands. Dalton did not state any limitations to a wife testifying in the 
defence of her husband and merely advanced that in respect of testifying against her husband 
she was not legally bound.175 Dalton’s treatise contributed to the early development of the rules 
governing spousal non-compellability and with its emergence it became clear that its 
foundations rested on a  biblical premise that wives were to remain loyal to their husbands and 
not divulge the details of their criminal activities, thus entrenching the concept of spousal non-
compellability but this did not mean that they were not competent witnesses .176 
In 1628 the position advanced by Dalton177 was drastically reversed by Lord Coke178 who 
remarked that wives were incompetent witnesses against their husbands irrespective of whether 
they testified in support of them or against them in the following statement: 
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“Note it hath been resolved, that a wife cannot be produced either for or against her husband, quia 
sunt duae animae in carne una, and it might be a cause of implacable discord and dissension between 
them, and a means of great inconvenience.”179 
 In these utterances he declared a rule contrary to the view advanced by Dalton.180 Lord Coke181 
failed to note Daltons182 view which preceded his rule and has been accredited with the creation 
of the rule of spousal incompetency in English common law.183  
The rule was quickly accepted by the courts and although initially only referred to wives, it 
was soon extended to husbands as well.184 By the end of the 17th century it had become the 
catalyst for all matters involving spousal testimony.185 This meant that in any proceedings that 
involved a husband and wife as a party to the action, neither of them were permitted to give 
evidence.186 
With all spouses being declared incompetent witnesses, the non-compellability of a spouse was 
no longer an issue for determination.187 Although Lord Cokes’188 spousal incompetence rule 
drastically changed the position that was proposed by Dalton189 it appeared that it did not 
eliminate it in its entirety.190 Evidence of this can be found in the treatise of Hale in 1676191 
where he references both Lord Coke192 in respect of spousal incompetency and Dalton193 in 
respect of collateral cases.194  
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Many suggest that while Lord Cokes’195 rule dominated legal theory at the time, the principles 
expounded by Dalton196 to an extent operated alongside it particularly in those matters where 
the rule advanced by Lord Coke197 did not pronounce on an issue and therefore was not 
applicable.198 On these occasions the door was left open for the development and reform of 
spousal privilege within English law.199 
 
2.4 Statutory Development of Marital Privilege in English law 
Although marital privilege was birthed through the common law, substantial changes that 
sought to formalise this area of law only occurred through the development of legislation.  
In 1853 the common law was revised upon the recommendation of the Commissioners on 
Common Law Procedure.200 The main aim of the commission was to achieve a balance between 
the “the alarm and unhappiness” that would be caused by the disclosure of confidential marital 
communications to the public and the disadvantage that may occur as a result of such 
disclosures.201 The recommendations of the commission led to the creation of the Evidence 
Amendment Act202 which pronounced that husbands and wives were competent and 
compellable except in criminal matters or matters involving adultery.  
Thus, it followed, that the spousal incompetency rule was abrogated, however confidential 
communication between spouses were to be regarded as privileged. 
In 1898 the Criminal Evidence Act203 made spouses competent witnesses against the accused 
spouse in criminal proceedings while still allowing spouses to enjoy the protection of marital 
privilege. Thus, a spouse could testify against an accused spouse on behalf of the prosecution 
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should they elect to do so but that spouse could not be compelled to testify in terms of section 
53 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act.204  
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act205 currently governs spousal privilege as contained in 
the provisions under section 80.206  
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According to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act207 spouses are competent and compellable 
witnesses against each other during the marriage and this persists even after divorce.208 That 
means that marital privilege does not extend to divorced persons as the status of such a witness 
is as if they were never married at all.209  
The privilege is only applicable to persons who are legally married and therefore has attracted 
much criticism for excluding co-habitants and other long-term life partnerships from the ambit 
of the privileges’ protection.  This issue was brought before the court in R v Pearce210 in which 
it was argued , that Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights211 which lists 
respect for family life, necessitated that co-habitants be treated the same as married persons, 
however the court did not accept this argument, choosing instead to restrict non-compellability 
to certain category of witnesses and highlighting the difficulty the court would experience if it 
were to distinguish a long term relationship for the purpose of compellability.212  
Section 80(2A) and (3) of The Police and Criminal Evidence Act213 sets out exceptions to the 
spousal non-compellability rule, these include a specific category of offences as listed in 
section 80(3) (a)–(c),214 some of which are cases involving sexual offences, and assault to either 
the spouse or a child under the age of 16 years including attempts or conspiracy to commit 
these offences.215  
The reason for the list of offences for which spouses are compelled to testify was a balancing 
act by parliament to ensure the protection of the marital relationship and try and address the 
needs of the public in ensuring crimes are prosecuted effectively.216 It was also concerned with 
crimes associated with sexual abuse and domestic violence. It has been suggested that ‘offences 
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involving assault’ are defined as more than a simple assault and could include robbery.217  As 
far as the 16-year age provision goes it does create some anomalies, for example a spouse 
would be compelled to testify in relation to offences committed against a child under the age 
of 16 irrespective if that child is born out of the marriage or not however if the child is sixteen 
and above the spouse is a non-compellable witness.218  
 
2.5 The adoption of marital privilege in South Africa 
The principles that govern marital privilege in both criminal and civil proceedings in South 
African law can be traced back to our British predecessors. For the purpose of this study focus 
will be placed on the development of marital privilege in criminal proceedings. 
The Cape colony first introduced spousal non-compellability in South Africa through the 
formulation of Ordinance No 72 of 1830.219 This merely confirmed the position as adopted in 
English law, that spouses were both incompetent and non-compellable witnesses.220  
In 1886 this area of the law progressed through the enactment of section 6 of the Administration 
of Justice Act 221by the Cape legislature which read as follows: 
 “In any proceeding against any persons for any crime or offence, such person and the wife or husband, 
as the case may be, of such person may, if such person thinks fit, be called, sworn, examined, and cross-
examined as an ordinary witness in the case.”222 
This time around the Cape legislature appeared to be ahead of their English counterparts who 
only passed a similar provision in 1898 in the form of the Criminal Evidence Act.223 
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In 1859, Natal followed the Cape colony in its adoption of marital privilege by enacting Law 
17 of 1859 exactly as laid out in English law.224 The law was developed further in 1888 and 
spouses of accused were now regarded as competent but not compellable witnesses in criminal 
proceedings.225 Through this development it appeared that the right to invoke marital privilege 
was therefore given to the testifying spouse who could decide to divulge confidential marital 
communications or not.226 This was different to the position adopted by the Cape colony in 
which the holder of the right remained the spouse who had made the communication as it was 
the accused who had the right to determine if the spouse was fit to testify and thus the accused 
spouse had a choice whether to call the other spouse as a witness or not.227 
The Orange Free State228 and Transvaal229 took a different approach than that of the Cape and 
Natal and went a step further to extend the privilege to a divorced person in relation to 
communications made during the marriage.230 
The different approaches adopted by the colonies in South Africa would overtime become 
problematic and perhaps the lawmakers had reasonable foresight that this was an eventuality. 
Presumably to remedy this situation the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act231 came into 
operation on 1 January 1918. This piece of legislation sought to consolidate the different rules 
adopted by the colonies in respect of evidence and procedure. 
Marital privilege was made provision for, in section 296 of the Criminal Procedure and 
Evidence Act.232Section 296 (1) was a modification of section 4 of the Cape Act.233Section 
296(2) was a re-enactment, with modifications, of section 19 of the old Law of Evidence 
Ordinance234. Section 296 was re-enacted as section 229 of the Criminal Procedure Act.235 This 
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section was in turn re-enacted, with verbal modifications, as the current section 198 of the 
CPA.236 
The provisions of these sections reinforced that a spouse may not be compelled to testify in so 
far as the evidence relates to marital communications made while the marriage relationship 
subsisted, and that marital privilege was extended to include divorced persons where the 
marriage no longer existed due to dissolution or annulment by a court competent to do so.237 
The adoption of the CPA238 saw the inclusion of section 195 and section 198 of the CPA.239  
Section 195 of the CPA240 provided as follows: “the wife or husband of an accused shall not be 
competent to give evidence for the prosecution in criminal proceedings, but shall be competent and 
compellable to give evidence for the prosecution at such proceedings where the accused is charged 
with. . . .”241  The CPA in the form of section 195 made provision for a list of offences for which 
a spouse may be compellable and therefore was unable to rely on the protection of marital 
privilege.242 
Spouses were only declared to be competent and non-compellable in 1988 when section 195 
and section 196 of the CPA243 were amended by subsection 6 and 7 of the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act244. Section 198 of the CPA245provided as follows: “No husband shall be 
compellable to disclose any communication made to him by his wife during the marriage, and no wife 
shall be compellable to disclose any communication made to her by her husband during the 
marriage.”246 
The current position remains that a spouse is both competent and compellable to tender 
evidence on behalf of the accused spouse. However, when required to testify on behalf of the 
prosecution the testifying spouse is only compellable in the instance where the accused has 
                                                          
236 Supra note 2. 
237 Supra note 21. 
238 Ibid. 
239 Supra note 2. 
240 Ibid. 
241 Ibid. 
242 Supra note 8. 
243 Supra note 2. 
244 Act No.45 of 1988. 
245 Supra note 2. 
246 Ibid. 
 32 
been charged with an offence that falls within a specific category listed under section 195 of 
the CPA.247  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
The origins of marital privilege reflect that it is a law that is premised on an outdated and 
primitive biblical notion that clearly is inconsistent with many principles of our law today 
particularly the right to equality. Despite the serious flaws evident within the privilege it has 
persistently remained intact through centuries of legal development and reform and even up 
until today enjoys more protection than those afforded to other categories of witnesses. The 
question remains as to whether marriage still deserves the privilege our law has guaranteed it, 
is it a concept that remains worthy of the pedestal that the law has placed it on? 
South Africa has adopted the same principles as that of the English in entrenching marital 
privilege within our law.248 Thus, we have inherited the same criticism as our English 
counterparts that the privilege is outdated and excludes the modern definitions of relationships 
which in the current day is varied and far reaching. This chapter has revealed that marital 
privilege has moved away from a reflection of divine law from which it originated and instead 
is seen to reflect an antiquated notion that excludes the realities of the modern day. The law 
reform commissioners in England reaffirmed this when it recommended that the privilege in 
civil proceedings be abolished stating that “it is unrealistic to suppose that candour of 
communication between husband and wife is influenced today by the statutory provisions.”249 
The discussion in the next chapter will be focused on the South African legal position in respect 
of marital privilege. It will examine the relationship between the current legislative framework 
and the constitution. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Any study of marital privilege necessitates an analysis of the legal framework out of which this 
privilege operates. In this chapter, a discussion will follow on the provisions of the CPA250 as 
they relate to marital privilege and its constitutionality. A brief study on how the courts have 
approached marital privilege in light of case law will also be undertaken. 
It is imperative from the inception to analyse the differences between the compellability of a 
testifying spouse for the defence and on behalf of the prosecution. In respect of the defence, 
the spouse of an accused is competent and compellable.251 In relation to a co-accused, the 
testifying spouse, is competent but non-compellable.252 With regard to testifying on behalf of 
the prosecution the spouse of an accused is a competent witness but as a rule cannot be 
compelled to testify in this capacity unless the crime falls within a specific category as set out 
in section 195 of the CPA.253 
 
3.2 Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Act254 
The spouse is therefore both competent and compellable only where the accused is charged 
with a crime falling within the categories as set out in the provisions of section 195 of the act 
listed below: 
“(a) Any offence committed against the person of either of them or of a child of either of them.” 
“(b) Any offence under Chapter 8 of the Child Care Act 1983 committed in respect of any child of either 
of them.”  
‘(c) Any contravention of any provision of s 31(1) of the Maintenance Act 1998, or of such provision as   
applied by any other law.” 
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“(d) Bigamy.” 
“(e) Incest as contemplated in s 12 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) 
Amendment Act 32 of 2007.” 
“(f) Abduction.”  
“(g) Any contravention of any provision of s 2, 8, 10, 11, 12, 12A, 17 or 20 of the Sexual Offences Act 
1957.” 
“(g A) any contravention of any provision of s 17 or 23 of Act 32 of 2007 as referred to in (e) above; “ 
“(h) Perjury committed in connection with or for the purpose of any judicial proceedings instituted or 
to be instituted or contemplated by the one of them against the other, or in connection with or for the 
purpose of criminal proceedings in respect of any offence included in this subsection.” 
“(i) The statutory offence of making a false statement in any affidavit or any affirmed, solemn or attested 
declaration if it is made in connection with or for the purpose of any such proceedings as are mentioned 
in (h) above.” 
The development of a category of offences that deem spouses compellable witnesses, is in 
terms of the ‘removal of choice’ argument.255 The rationale is that by forcing a spouse to testify, 
the likelihood that the accused would unduly pressurise the testifying spouse into not giving 
evidence, is reduced.256 Further it would prevent the testifying spouse from being put in a 
compromising position where that spouse would have to make the personal choice to testify 
against the accused, thereby creating a situation where that spouse could face reprisal creating 
a disharmonious situation in the home environment.257 
It would appear that the main objective of marital privilege and particularly the creation of a 
category of offences in terms of section 195 of the CPA258 is that the marriage would remain 
protected.259 The fact that the spouse is compelled to testify in terms of these offences means 
that he or she would be less susceptible to harm from the accused because the testifying spouse 
is giving evidence because he or she is being forced to testify and not of their own volition.260 
However, this argument does not hold much weight in that the offences that are covered by 
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section 195 of the CPA could in any event lead to the destruction of the marriage whether she 
is compelled to testify or not as most of the offences affect the marriage directly or indirectly 
as it may relate to the spouse or their children.261 Thus, it is submitted that the existence of a 
category of offences bears no specific relevance.262 Therefore, it is argued that there remains 
no reason why the spouse should not be subjected to the same rules as any other competent 
witness and be compellable for all matters not just those subject to the categories as per section 
195 of the CPA.263 
The second reason for the creation of a category of compellable offences is that it would serve 
the public interest not to allow the accused to escape liability on the basis of spousal non-
compellability.264 It would certainly be difficult to justify why certain crimes were not being 
prosecuted on the basis of non-compellability of spouses therefore it would appear that in an 
attempt to alleviate public outcry the legislators decided that for certain offences spouses would 
be made compellable. In ensuring that there are certain crimes that will not be subject to spousal 
non-compellability it creates the impression that the interests of justice are being served.265 In 
theory this may appear to be the case but in practice it is highly debatable. 
The inclusion of a list of offences that are exempted from spousal non-compellability appears 
to have been a meagre attempt to reform marital privilege in South Africa. While noteworthy, 
the problems associated with such a list is deserving of consideration. 
The New Zealand Law Commission266 paid particular attention to the difficulties encountered 
with such a list and the operation of the spousal non-compellability privilege in its law and as 
a result thereof sought to abrogate the privilege in its entirety from the common law through 
the release of a Draft Evidence Code.267 Although the Draft Evidence Code268 is yet to be 
adopted by parliament the New Zealand Law Commission’s269 comment in relation to a list of 
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category of offences for which spouses are compellable witnesses is noteworthy, it stated the 
following: 
 
“ . . . These lists of specified offences require decisions by law-makers on competing public interests 
that are too broad, and too reliant on intuition rather than information on actual costs. The evolution 
of such lists in other jurisdictions has also shown that over time arbitrary distinctions develop. They 
create the potential for complex procedural problems at trials which involve several charges, not all of 
which involve listed offences. These problems are exacerbated if there is more than one accused.”270 
Section 195 of the CPA271 is no exception to the above and appears to be plagued with its own 
set of problems. Firstly, the list fails to incorporate many serious offences such as murder.272 
The list appears to place importance on familial relationships over other persons, thus a spouse 
can be compelled to testify about the abuse or assault of their own child but not about the abuse 
or assault of somebody else’s child.  
An additional problem is that our courts have restrictively interpreted the term ‘offence against 
the person’,273 which generally is taken to mean the crime of assault.274 The question remains 
as to whether this may be in line with the original purpose of the legislature. Du Toit275 suggests 
there appears to be no reason why this provision should not include other crimes, particularly 
those that infringe personality rights such as crimen injuria. This certainly exposes the 
interpretational difficulties encountered with section 195.  
The term ‘spouse’ under section 195 includes divorced persons provided that the testifying 
spouse is required to give evidence pertaining to events during the subsistence of the marriage. 
This was decided in the case of S v Taylor276 when the court stated that the words “wife or 
husband” contained in section 195 and section 196 of the CPA,277 include divorced persons 
when required to give evidence regarding events during the marriage.278 
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 The rationale behind extending the non-compellability privilege to include former spouses is, 
that should divorced persons not be included, than it would be mean that the principle of 
incompetence in respect of former spouses would be applicable.279 This would create an 
untenable situation which would clearly not have been in line with the legislative purpose. 
Thus, the inclusion of former spouses in the interpretation of section 195 of the CPA280 appears 
to be in accordance with the purpose of the legislature and according to Du toit281 an appropriate 
decision.282 It would not be logical to have spouses compellable in terms of section 195 of the 
CPA283 and former spouses non-compellable when marital privilege in terms of section 198 of 
the CPA284 is afforded to both current and former spouses of an accused.285 
A further problem encountered is when an accused is faced with numerous charges and a 
testifying spouse is a compellable witness for some and not all of these charges.286 It has been 
proposed that the situation could be alleviated by trying the compellable offences separately 
from the non-compellable offences.287 This however may not be practical where the material 
facts in dispute are inter related to the other offences as well as when one considers the costs 
and time delays that may occur in the separation of these trials due to non-compellability.288 
 
3.3 Section 198 of the Criminal Procedure Act289  
In South Africa spousal non-compellability as it relates to criminal proceedings is given effect 
to in section 198 of the CPA290. The section provides as follows: 
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“No husband shall be compellable to disclose any communication made to him by his wife during the 
marriage, and no wife shall be compellable to disclose any communication made to her by her husband 
during the marriage.”291 
 
3.3.1 The holder of the privilege 
According to section 198 of the CPA,292 the accused spouse cannot claim spousal non-
compellability. Thus, it is the spouse to whom the communication is made who is left with the 
decision to testify or not which does not require the approval of the accused spouse as it is the 
testifying spouse that is the holder of the privilege.293 This is in stark contrast to the principles 
that govern other privileges in South African law. 294 
The two most distinguishable features are that in all other privileges, it is the accused person 
that is the holder of the privilege and therefore must give consent in order for the privilege to 
be waived.295 An example of this can be found in legal professional privilege where the accused 
is the person that can decide to invoke or waive the privilege.296 The second feature flows from 
the first in that, the holder is the person who will benefit from the existence of the privilege and 
thus it is communications made by the holder that is sought to be protected.297 
The question then arises, is the spouse to whom the communication is made, the rightful holder 
of marital privilege? 
In Rumping v DPP298 Lord Reid notes: 
“It is a mystery to me why it was decided to give this privilege to the spouse who is a witness: it means 
that if that spouse wishes to protect the other he or she will disclose what helps the other spouse but 
use this privilege to conceal communications if they would be injurious, but on the other hand a spouse 
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who has become unfriendly to the other spouse will use this privilege to disclose communications if they 
are injurious to the other spouse but conceal them if they are helpful.”299 
If one is to adopt the general approach with regard to all other privileges than one could argue 
that the rightful holder of the privilege should be the accused spouse as he or she is the person 
who has made the communication and as a result he or she can be the only person that may 
consent to the disclosure of such communication.300 However, another suitable alternative, is 
that both the testifying spouse and accused spouse be made the joint holders of the privilege, 
due to the fact that the communications are subject to a marital contract therefore both share 
the right to waive the privilege.301 
Both these arguments are compelling as it is clear that affording the testifying spouse the 
privilege at the exclusion of the accused is not in accordance with all other privileges. It is 
certainly illogical to ignore the accused spouse, as the one who is deserving of the protection 
of the privilege and give all power to the testifying spouse as the holder of the right. There 
always remains the risk that there may be an abuse of such power as pointed out in Rumping v 
DPP.302 Particularly in instances where the relationship has soured, and the testifying spouse 
seeks revenge against the accused spouse. The accused who has made the confidential 
communication therefore remains unprotected.303 In all other privileges it is the person who 
made the communication that is protected, and the privilege therefore operates to that person’s 
benefit.304 
 
3.3.2 Former spouses/divorced persons 
Marital privilege extends to former spouses, it can therefore, be invoked after the dissolution 
of the marriage although it is only applicable to communications disclosed while the marital 
relationship was in existence.305 Section 198 (2) of the CPA306 provides that the privilege does 
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not apply to widows and to those former spouses whose marriage was dissolved extra-
judicially.307 The main justification for the privilege has always been the protection of the 
marriage and yet the privilege extends where the marriage is no longer in existence. There is 
no valid reason as to why it may be necessary for the privilege to be extended to former spouses 
as the marital harmony is no longer at risk and there is no conjugal relationship that may be 
harmed should a former spouse be compelled to testify.308 The fact that divorced persons are 
included under the ambit of protection in terms of marital privilege is therefore illogical and 
baseless. The ideal approach would be to determine marital status when the spouse is required 
to give evidence and not when the communications were made.309 This would then be in line 
with the justification advanced for the development of marital privilege which is to protect the 
marital relationship and guard against the destruction of the marriage. There is no marital 
relationship to protect once the marriage is dissolved thus it is unfathomable why the law would 
still allow the privilege to persist upon the termination of the marriage. 
 
3.3.3 Third parties 
Any other person that hears the confidential communications between spouses can testify 
against the accused spouse and cannot be forced or prevented from doing so.310 Although some 
have argued that this may be a contravention of the right to privacy 311 it is widely accepted 
that it is in the interest of society that such communications be heard by the courts.312 It is 
submitted that it would cast the net too wide if third persons who overheard the confidential 
communication between spouses were afforded a privilege against testifying and would make 
it difficult for legislators to draw the line, thus third persons should be treated as any other 
category of witnesses.313 This appears more logical and in line with the justification of the 
privilege which is to protect the marriage and not the accused spouse. 
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3.4 The constitutionality of marital privilege 
Over the years the constitutionality of marital privilege has become questionable.314 Spouses 
under South African law are defined as “a party to a marriage that is recognised as valid in law 
and not beyond that’.315 Section 198 bestows a privilege on a husband or wife, thereby 
affording protection only to persons that are in a marital relationship that is recognised by law. 
The privilege does not make provision for persons that are in permanent life partnerships and 
co-habitants whether heterosexual or same sex, and also excludes those persons who choose 
not to marry or are prevented from doing so legally.316 
 A pertinent argument raised is that even such persons are deserving of protection in respect of 
the confidential communications they share.317 Is it necessary to distinguish between a marriage 
and other types of relationships for the purpose of compellability? It is submitted that the 
answer to this question is no. It has been argued that the concept of marriage is just one type 
of partnership and that marriage is beyond the control of an individual.318 
In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs319 the following 
was noted: 
“Courts may say, in response to heterosexual cohabitants, that they chose not to marry and cannot ask 
for assistance from the courts once they exercised this choice. One response to this is that ``choice'' 
must be understood contextually. In South Africa, gender inequality, disempowerment of women, 
poverty and ignorance of the law all contribute towards removing real choice from many people, 
especially poor women.”'320 
Many calls have been heeded to extend the definition of spouses to include life partners this 
has resulted in numerous cases and statutes in South Africa giving recognition to partners by 
broadening the definition of relationships to include partners and not only spouses.321 Marital 
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privilege differentiates between married persons and those who are not married and as a result 
finds itself at odds with the Constitution.322  
 
3.4.1 The right to equality 
The right to equality is of paramount importance to our democracy and is therefore one of the 
foundational rights within the Constitution. In Satchwell v President of the Republic323, Madala 
J refers to President of the Republic of South Africa324, where Goldstone J noted the following: 
“At the heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination lies a recognition that the purpose of our new 
constitutional and democratic order is the establishment of a society in which all human beings will be 
accorded equal dignity and respect regardless of their membership of particular groups. The 
achievement of such a society in the context of our deeply inegalitarian past will not be easy, but that 
that is the goal of the Constitution should not be forgotten or her.” 325 
Forming part of this constitutional vision is the recognition that all South Africans form part of 
a diverse society which is made up of different relationships that do not always fit the mould 
of a conventional marriage. It is the equality of all South Africans that contribute to this 
diversity that the Constitution seeks to protect. 
Section 9 (the `equality clause', as it is known) states the following: 
“(1) everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the 
law.” 
‘(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the 
achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance 
persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.” 
“(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or 
more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, 
colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and 
birth.” 
“(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or 
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more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or 
prohibit unfair discrimination.” 
“(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is 
established that the discrimination is fair”'326 
Naude327 highlights that the test for a violation of the equality clause is set out in Harksen v 
Lane NO and others328 and is as follows.329 
1. “Does the relevant provision differentiate between people or categories of people?”   
‘If it does, does the differentiation bear a rational connection to a legitimate government 
purpose”? If it does not, then there is a violation of section 9(1). Even if there is such a 
connection, it might still amount to discrimination in terms of section 9(3) or (4)”.330 
2. “Does the differentiation amount to unfair discrimination?”  
3. “This requires a two-stage enquiry: 
(i) First, does the differentiation amount to `discrimination'? If the discrimination is on a 
specific ground, then it will have been established. If it is not on a specific ground, then 
whether or not there is discrimination will depend upon whether, objectively, the 
ground is based on attributes and characteristics which have the potential to impair 
the fundamental human dignity of persons as human beings or to affect them adversely 
in a comparably serious manner.”331 
(ii) “If the differentiation amounts to `discrimination', does it amount to `unfair 
discrimination'? If it has been found to have been on a specific ground, then unfairness 
will be presumed. If it has been on an unspecified ground, unfairness will have to be 
established by the complainant. The test of unfairness focuses primarily on the impact 
of the discrimination on the complainant and others in a similar situation. If this stage 
of the inquiry finds the differentiation not to be unfair, there will be no violation of 
subsections (3) and (4).”332 
4.  “The second stage is to determine if the provision can be justified under the limitation 
clause.”333  
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In terms of the first stage of the enquiry it is submitted that the provisions of section 198 of the 
CPA334 makes a distinction between married persons and unmarried persons.335 It is argued 
however that such a differentiation is justified as a rational government objective and as a result 
thereof is not necessarily a violation of section 9(1) of the constitution. 336 
On application of the second stage of enquiry the differentiation on the basis of marital status 
is unfair discrimination.337 Further, the fact that marital status is included as a specified ground 
in terms of section 9 (3) of the constitution338 means that unfairness is presumed and a prima 
facie violation of section 9(3) has indeed occurred.339 However discrimination is not 
automatically deemed to be unfair.340 In Harksen v Lane341the court stated that in deciding this 
issue , the impact that such discrimination on the victim must be considered by taking into 
account a number of factors which should be assessed objectively in respect of its cumulative 
effect. 
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 342 dealt with 
unfair discrimination based on marital status, in this case, the constitutional court held that the 
provisions of the Aliens Control Act343 which granted spouses of South African citizens a right 
to an immigration permit amounted to unfair discrimination on the basis of marital status. The 
provisions of the Aliens Control Act,344 much like section 198 of the CPA345 differentiated 
between married persons and those that were not married in that it granted a benefit to spouses 
that was not available to unmarried category of persons which included life partners and co-
habitants.346 
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The Constitutional Court also highlighted that the manner in which the protection of the 
traditional marital regime is carried out must not unjustifiably limit the constitutional rights of 
life partners in same sex relationships.347 There appears to be no rational connection between 
the justification for the existence of marital privilege which is to ensure the marital relationship 
is protected and the exclusion of life partners from the privilege provided for in terms of section 
198 of the CPA.348 
 
The third and final stage of the enquiry deals with whether section 198 of the CPA349 is a 
justifiable limitation in terms of section 36 of the constitution.350 If the limitation cannot be 
justified than the provisions of section 198 should be declared unconstitutional.351 
Section 36352 highlights certain criteria which tests the constitutional justification of a right. A 
right is justifiably limited when it is said to be “reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on equality, freedom and human dignity.”353 In this regard section 
36(1) (b) and subsection (1)(d)354 provides a guiding threshold in the form of a test  that 
measures whether there is a reasonable and justifiable balance of competing rights.355 These 
sections operate to (1) determine whether there is a legitimate purpose in restricting a practice 
and (2) determine whether a connection exists between the limiting measure and what it 
purports to achieve.356 It would appear therefore that section 198 is not a justifiable limitation 
of the right to equality. 
The Constitutional Court (CC) in Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re 
Certificate of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa357  emphasised the point that the 
right to marry was not a constitutionally protected right unlike the right to equality.358 Thus the 
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importance attached to the right to equality would be much higher than that of marriage. The 
slightest suggestion that they were equal in any measure would be preposterous. 
It, therefore, follows that, when comparing the right to equality to that of the exclusive right to 
marital privilege, section 9 of the Constitution359 clearly dictates that a spousal communication 
privilege is unconstitutional.360  
 
3.5 The right to privacy  
The right to privacy is another argument advanced in justification for the existence and 
preservation of marital privilege. While it is argued that the right to privacy should not be 
disregarded in its entirety it certainly is not compelling enough against the right to equality as 
highlighted above. Noteworthy is the argument advanced by Naude361 that to afford an 
exclusive consideration of the right to privacy in respect of spousal privilege will create an 
anomalous situation.362 This is best illustrated through a practical example: 
A, the spouse of Y witnesses a murder of a child and will be compelled to testify as to the 
murder. The situation would be different if A did not witness the crime but Y admitted to A 
that he had murdered a child, as a recipient of such information A would not be forced to testify 
against Y. 363 
It is submitted in support of the view favoured by Naude364 that there is no distinction between 
communications where a crime has already been perpetrated and communications about the 
planning of a crime.365 In both these instances a spouse should be compellable.366 
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3.6 An interpretation of spousal non-compellability by the courts of South Africa 
South African courts have dealt with a limited amount of cases that relate to spousal 
competence and non-compellability. A brief discussion of a few of these cases in respect of the 
principles they have expounded will follow. 
In S v Leepile and Others367 the court held that the exact time when events occurred is 
irrelevant, therefore it does not matter that at the time of the incident in question the testifying 
spouse was not married to the accused. In this case the court also found that a marriage entered 
into during an adjournment in proceedings under section 189 (1) of the CPA368 was held to be 
valid for the purposes of section 195 (1) of the CPA 369 even though the motive of the parties 
in entering into the marriage was to afford the witness a 'just excuse' for refusing to answer 
questions put to her in terms of section 189 (1) of the CPA370. 
The court in R v Algar371 held that former spouses were competent but not compellable to 
testify about events which took place during the marriage. Where the marriage has terminated 
or been annulled the reason therefore is not relevant unless the marriage was declared void ab 
initio, in which event no marriage existed at the time of the occurrence of the events.372  
In the case of S v Mgcwabe373the court looked at whether the fact that the marriage relationship 
had been severely damaged negated the immunity afforded to a testifying spouse and the court 
answered that it did not.374  
 
The court stated that section 195(1) gives the spouse “An absolute right to make an election not to 
testify'; it does not provide that a spouse shall not be compellable to give evidence 'only if this is 
necessary to preserve the marriage relationship.”375 
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In S v Louw376the court found that the fact that the accused intended to marry an essential state 
witness before the commencement of the trial, and that as a result thereof the witness would 
become non-compellable in terms of section 195 of the CPA377,  was not a justifiable reason 
for refusing to grant the accused bail. 
 
In S v Vengetsamy378  a woman, married in accordance with Hindu rites, was regarded as a non-
compellable against her husband on the ground that the marriage was a monogamous union 
and constituted a valid marriage even though it was customary in nature. The court in S v 
Johardien379  however, was of the view that the decision in Vengetsamy380 was incorrect and 
did not follow it. The position has since changed with the adoption of subsection (2) of Act 18 
of 1996. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
The points of criticism discussed above highlight the need for the revision of the laws that 
dictate the principles of spousal non-compellability. It is however in the Constitution381 that we 
find the most compelling need for reformation.    
South Africa is a country that prides itself in its Constitution.382 It remains the highest law in 
the land and as a result all other laws and conduct are subject to constitutional scrutiny in order 
to be validated. Deeply embedded in the Constitution383 is the fundamental right to equality 
and section 198 of the CPA384 appears to be in violation of that right. 
The purpose of section 198 of the CPA385 is based on policy considerations that have resulted 
in the elevation of the institution of marriage at the exclusion of all other relationships to a 
position that it may no longer deserve. An examination of marital privilege in relation to the 
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equality provisions in the constitution386 reveal that it is a concept in our law that fails to pass 
constitutional muster. It is highly unlikely that the manner in which spouses confide in each 
other would change if marital privilege did not exist.387 
The provisions discriminate on the basis of marital status and can no longer be sustained in this 
post constitutional era. Amidst the right to equality is the test in terms of section 36 of the 
constitution388, which sets out the test to determine whether there is a justification for limiting 
the right to equality. The need to afford spouses a privilege to not testify against an accused 
spouse over other persons in other relationships which for all intents and purposes amounts to 
a marital relationship is not a justifiable limitation of the right to equality. While it may be 
argued that marital privilege remains an important part of our criminal justice system the 
question that must be asked is at what expense? It is a privilege that is certainly not absolute as 
it is an obstruction to the truth-seeking process. The dilatory tactics adopted by the legislators 
in not giving the problems associated with the privilege adequate attention, has resulted in an 
abandonment of its obligation to uphold the right to equality. While the future of marital 
privilege remains to be seen, if the constitution is to be taken seriously it is a matter that must 
be given immediate consideration. 
A movement towards legal reform in respect of marital privilege will require an examination 
of developments in foreign jurisdictions as there is little authority on the subject in South 
Africa. The next chapter undertakes a review of the position in American law and the evolution 
of spousal non-compellability within its jurisdiction.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Perhaps the quandary that has arisen regarding spousal non-compellability in South African 
law can best be resolved with a comparative analysis of international law. Our jurisprudence is 
simply replete with references to international law materials. Thus, it is important to consider 
the identification and interpretation of marital privilege in foreign jurisdictions. In this chapter 
the evolution of marital privilege in the United States of America will be discussed. 
 
4.2. Historical development 
 The first traces of marital privilege in American courts can be found in the case of Stein v. 
Bowman389 in 1839. This marked the introduction of the privilege into federal common law.390 
Although as the discussion in chapter one revealed the origins of the privilege date back to 
medieval times. In American law there were divergent views adopted by both the courts and 
the legislators in respect of the rule in English common law that spouses were not compellable 
witnesses for the defence.391 According to Wigmore392 who advances the majority American 
view on marital privilege, while there is a distinct principle that exists in which it is recognised 
that spouses should not testify against each other it has never been elevated to a separate rule 
related to spousal non-compellability.393 This was primarily due to the fact that the evidence of 
a spouse against an accused spouse would be inadmissible as spouses were not allowed to 
testify against each other in any event.394The general principle therefore that spouses were 
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disqualified as witnesses against each other remained intact up until the 19th century.395 It was 
only abolished in federal courts in 1933 in the case of Funk v United States396 when spouses 
became eligible to testify on behalf of an accused spouse.397 In as much as the court in Funk 
eliminated the rule against spousal competence it maintained that an accused spouse would be 
able to prevent the other spouse from testifying adversely against him or her.398 This decision 
saw the general rule of spousal incompetence evolve into the adverse spousal testimony 
privilege, significantly distinct from spousal disqualification.399 
The justification for the privilege being the protection of the marital relationship faced harsh 
criticism as many commentators viewed this as a benign purpose.400 Wigmore termed the 
privilege “the merest anachronism in legal theory and an indefensible obstruction to truth in 
practice.”401 This view was supported by the Committee on Improvements in the Law of 
Evidence of the American Bar association402 which sought the abolishment of such a privilege. 
In 1942 in light of the criticism levied against the privilege, the American law institute in its 
Model Code of Evidence403 in support of the continued existence of a privilege to protect 
marital communications, stated that there was no need for the right afforded to an accused 
spouse to be able to exclude adverse testimony from the other spouse.404 This move was closely 
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followed by the Uniform rules of Evidence in 1953405 which limited the scope of the privilege 
to communications made in confidence only.406 
In Hawkins v United States,407 the future of the privilege in federal courts was considered but 
the court chose to leave the rule intact and interestingly rejected the governments’ suggestions 
of reforming the privilege by making the testifying spouse the holder of the right thereby 
abrogating control from the accused spouse.408 This position has been adopted in terms of South 
African Law. The court in Hawkins v United States409 appeared to be reluctant to undertake 
any serious modification of the rule against adverse spousal testimony and as a result, the 
privilege remained intact, spouses could therefore not testify against each other unless they 
both consented.410 The only exceptions noted are cases in which one spouse commits a crime 
against the other and in recent times has included crimes against children of either spouse and 
the property of a spouse.411 The court did however remark that its judgement was not intended 
to, ‘foreclose whatever changes in the rule may eventually be dictated by reason and 
experience.’412 
In retrospect it would seem that the court in Hawkins v United States413 was prophetic in its 
foresight that reform in this area of the law may be necessitated by reason and experience. This 
was to come to fruition in the form of the Federal Rules of Evidence 501414 which gave the 
courts the power to develop privilege regarding evidence in federal criminal trials.415 This was 
to be substituted by a separate set of rules drafted by the Judicial Conference Advisory 
Committee416 which contained a total of nine privilege including a husband and wife 
privilege.417 The result would have been a codification of the Hawkins rule and an elimination 
                                                          
405 Drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform state laws, 1953. 
406 Supra note 397 pg.835. 
407 358, U.S 74(1958). 
408 Supra note 397 at pg.834. 
409 Supra note 407. 
410 Supra note 397 at pg.834. 
411 Ibid. 
412 Supra note 401. 
413 Ibid. 
414 Federal rules of Evidence 501. 
415 Supra note 397. 
416 Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on rules of evidence. 
417 Supra note 397 at pg. 834. 
 53 
of the marital privilege. However congress rejected this proposal on the basis that it favoured 
a flexible approach to marital privilege in allowing courts to determine the rules case by case. 
Through the years and since Hawkins, support for the privilege has dwindled.418 Of the thirty 
one jurisdictions in which the privilege initially operated there are only 24 states that continue 
to advocate the need for the privilege.419The privilege has been criticised in that it sweeps too 
broadly and much like South Africa lacks consistency in the wider scope of other privileges. 
 
4.3 Current position  
Marital privilege in American law is currently governed covered by the Federal rules of 
evidence and may differ from state to state depending on statutes.420 In American law spouses 
are exempted from testifying in respect of certain communications.421  The basis for the 
privilege is the same as in South African law, which is the recognition that a marriage is sacred 
and therefore should be protected. 
The two types of marital privilege recognised by the Supreme court of appeal is testimonial 
privilege and marital communications privilege.422 According to testimonial privilege, a spouse 
cannot be compelled to give evidence against an accused spouse in criminal proceedings and 
it is the witness spouse that is the holder of the privilege.423 The marital communication 
privilege relates to acts and words communicated between spouses that are privileged.424 It 
provides that “communications between spouses, privately made, are generally assumed to 
have been intended to be confidential and hence they are privileged…”425 Through these words 
it advances the notion that if a communication between husband and wife is made in private 
with the intention that it remain confidential than the assumption is that such communication 
would be privileged.426 
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4.4 Defining Principles of Marital Privilege  
There are four principle elements of marital privilege in American law, the first that there must 
be a communication made, second that there must be the existence of a valid marriage, thirdly 
the communication must have been confidential and forth, the privilege must not have been 
waived.427 Marital privilege in American law is applicable to all proceedings irrespective of 
whether the spouse who made the communication is a party to the proceedings or not.428 This 
was the view taken by the court in Dalton v People,429 in this American case the convicted 
spouse was found guilty of stealing a car with another accused. She then wrote a letter to her 
husband while incarcerated. Even though the other spouse had no interest in the proceedings 
because his spouse was already convicted the court prevented the convicted spouse from 
revealing the contents of the letter in the accused defence.430 
The privilege exists even upon the dissolution of the marriage and its protections extends after 
death.431 Wigmore432 suggests and rightly so that the privilege should be limited in this regard 
particularly in cases where one spouse wants to utilise the privilege for his or her own defence 
or material interest in the absence of the deceased spouse.433 
Marital communications as defined in American law relate only to those communications made 
during the subsistence of the marriage. This is founded on the premise that the privilege exists 
in law to protect a marital relationship and nothing less. Wigmore434 infers that 
communications between spouses that are separated are covered under marital communications 
as the marriage remains legally valid. However, in the Model Code of Evidence435 enacted in 
1942 ‘spouses’ excludes husband and wives that are separated. Barton436 argues that it is 
illogical to exclude spouses who are separated from the protection of the privilege.437 In South 
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Africa the privilege covers spouses that are separated, this can be inferred from the provisions 
of section 198(1) and (2) of the CPA438 which make reference to ‘husbands’ and ‘wives’ and 
the fact that in our law the privilege includes former spouses. 
 
4.5 Pre-marital communications 
 Pre-marital communication is not regarded as privileged. However, in American law there 
appears to be differing views in lower federal courts whether the privilege covers 
communications made while spouses were married but only communicated afterwards.439 A 
practical example would be where A writes a letter to B during their marriage but directs that 
such letter only be opened upon the death of A.440  Is that communication deserving of 
protection under marital privilege when the marriage relationship has been terminated? This 
question was answered in the case of New York Life Ins Co v Ross441 where the court held that 
such communication is covered by marital privilege, the fact that it was only communicated 
after the marriage did not affect the fact that such communication was made during the 
subsistence of the marriage.442 It therefore appears that the applicable test would be to examine 
the intention of the communicating spouse at the time when the communication was made. The 
question therefore is,was it intended to be a communication during the marriage but delivered 
after death or one that was to be regarded as a post marital communication? The latter of course 
as laid out in the case of Mullin-Johnson Co v Penn Mutual Life Ins Co443 would not be 
deserving of protection under marital privilege.444  
Even though premarital communications are generally excluded from marital privilege it is 
presumed that where such communication would require one spouse to testify against the other 
than such testimony would be regarded as adverse and excluded.445 If, however the marriage 
is no longer in existence than the court would admit such evidence.446 In instances where the 
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communication was made before marriage but intended to be delivered after marriage it is 
regarded as marital communication.447  
This is perhaps best illustrated through a practical example used by Barton448, A writes a letter 
to his future bride B but indicates that the letter is only to be opened after they are married. 
Clearly the intention of A being the communicating spouse is that the communication be 
delivered after the marriage.449 Thus, it is logical that such communication should be protected 
in terms of marital privilege. 
 
4.6 Confidential communications 
In addition to the requirement that the communications must be made during the marriage, 
American law also requires that the communication be confidential.450  This is in stark contrast 
to South African and English law where the privilege protects ‘any communication’. In support 
of the confidential requirement, Wigmore451 pointed out that the purpose of marital privilege 
is to, “to ensure subjectively the unrestrained privacy of communication is not intended to be 
a private one the privilege has no application to it.”452  
As compared to the position adopted by South Africa and the English who have been reluctant 
to make a distinction between confidential communications and general communications, the 
Americans have boldly limited the privilege to only include confidential communications 
between spouses. Barton453 advances that there is no logical basis for the requirement that every 
single communication made between husband and wife should be excluded by virtue of marital 
privilege.454 There is merit in this argument. He cites Wigmore455 in this regard and points out 
the impracticality of such a blanket provision particularly in matters where spouses are business 
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partners and required to prove contracts this may be an impossible task if “any 
communication” between them would be privileged.456 
The primary difficulty with this distinction is the arduous task of determining whether a 
communication is confidential or not. Barton,457 alluding to the difficulties encountered by the 
English courts in this regard, suggests that the test that should be applied to determine 
admissibility of a confidential communication should be objective.458 The suggestion put forth 
by Wigmore459 appears to be more appealing, he maintains that the starting point should be a 
presumption that all communications made during a marriage are confidential unless it can be 
proven otherwise. 
Thus, the presumption favours confidentiality and once again highlights the efforts of 
American legislators to protect the interests of the communicating spouse.460 It is in this very 
principle that we find American law antithetical to South African and English law.  In South 
Africa and England there is no protection that is provided to the spouse who made the 
communication as it is the spouse to whom the communication is made, that remains the holder 
of the privilege.  
 
4.7 Third party  
Another noteworthy comparison is where a third party overhears the exchange of confidential 
communications between spouses. Is the communication still privileged now that the third 
party is involved? The case of Wolfe v United States461 is deserving of discussion in this regard. 
The facts briefly are that a spouse had read out a letter to his stenographer for typing addressed 
to his wife. The evidence that was being sought by the prosecution was the contents of such 
letter through the notes of the stenographer. The court relied on the common law in reaching 
its decision stating that competency in federal trials were dictated by common law and not 
statute. Barton462 suggests that this judgment indicates the divergent views that Americans take 
                                                          
456 Supra note 21. 
457 Ibid. 
 458 Ibid. 
459 Supra note 401. 
460 Supra note 21. 
461 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934). 
462 Supra note 21. 
 58 
of English common law.463 The court stated the immunity granted by marital privilege is vital 
to the preservation of the marriage and as such outweighs any negative effects on the 
administration of justice.464 The court did not decide the issue on whether the communication 
was confidential or not but focused on the confidential communications when a third party is 
privy to such communication. The court reached the decision that the communication was not 
privileged as the spouses could have communicated with each other freely and easily without 
the help of the stenographer if they had wanted the communication to remain confidential.465 
The court held the following, 
‘The privilege suppresses relevant testimony and could be allowed only when it is plain that 
marital confidence can otherwise not reasonably be preserved. Nothing in this case can suggest 
any such necessity.’466 
According to Wigmore the confidentiality is negated when a third person is in close proximity 
and as a result thereof may hear such communication between spouses and where there is the 
intention of the communicating spouse to share such communication with a third party.467 In 
both these instances it appears that there is some knowledge on the part of the spouse divulging 
the communication that by doing so there is the likelihood that a third party would hear such 
communication.468 This is perhaps the rationale that the court used in the Wolfe v United 
States469 case. The communication therefore would be admissible evidence by the spouse who 
made it. 
 Barton470 states that this defies the main justification of marital privilege as it is now dependent 
on the presence of a third party and not on the intention of the communicating spouse that the 
privilege remains confidential.471 Ultimately in instances where the communication made is 
confidential and a spouse may be prevented from disclosing such information there is nothing 
that stops a third party from divulging such communications whether the communicating 
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spouse was aware of the presence of the third party or not. Therein lies a point of criticism, in 
that American law seeks to protect the confidentiality of the communication, thereby 
advocating the interests of the communicating spouse by preventing the testifying spouse from 
disclosing such communications and yet in respect of third parties, the communicating spouse 
is largely unprotected and powerless should a third party choose to disclose the confidential 
communication he or she has overheard. As pointed out in the case of State v Freeman472 this 
approach is rather illogical.473 
A further point of criticism is that, this principle encourages people invading the privacy of 
spouses, by deliberately listening in on their communications, but Barton474 reminds us that the 
purpose of the privilege remains the protection of the marital relationship and not to ensure one 
spouse avoids criminal liability by preventing the other spouse from incriminating him or 
her.475 
What happens when the spouse to whom the communication is made deliberately divulges that 
confidential communication to a third party with the knowledge that while he or she may be 
prevented from testifying the same does not apply to the third party? As Barton476 highlights 
this may not apply to verbal communication as it is tantamount to hearsay and therefore would 
be inadmissible.477 However, it is a more likely a possibility through written evidence. 
Barton478 states that where a third party seeks to introduce evidence in a written form given to 
that third party by the spouse to whom the communication is made, then it should be decided 
upon as if it were that spouse testifying.479 Therefore, should the spouse who made such 
communication object than that evidence should be rendered inadmissible.480 
The courts decisions in this regard has varied. If the third party is in possession of such 
communication without any indication that there was some dubious conduct on the part of the 
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spouse to whom the communication was made than it would follow the general principle that 
a third party cannot be prevented from disclosing such confidential communication.481 It 
follows therefore that should a spouse lose such confidential written communication through 
theft, robbery etc than such communication is not protected by marital privilege should the 
third party who is in possession of such lost or stolen communication choose to disclose 
same.482 This advocates the justification of the privilege to protect the marital relationship 
which is not at risk should confidential communication be revealed by a third party as opposed 
to a spouse simply because the third party has no vested interest in the marriage. 
 
4.8 Other forms of communication 
The American courts have not been consistent in respect of its approach to communications by 
way of letters.483 In some cases, this evidence has been excluded while other cases have 
considered the letters to be admissible due to the provision in statute that refers to confidential 
communications and not written communications.484 
The above discussion focused on the confidentiality requirement in American law and while 
this is imperative in understanding the principles underpinning marital privilege, consideration 
must also be given to, what constitutes ‘communication’.  The main question to be answered 
is whether marital privilege only covers communication that is oral or written or does it also 
include observations made by one spouse about the conduct or physical appearance of the other 
spouse. Under South African law it can be presumed that it would include all communication 
by the term ‘any communication’ however there has been no explicit pronouncement on this 
aspect by our courts. 
Barton485 suggests that if one recognises that spoken or written word is not the only means of 
communication and that other forms of communication such as gestures exist than by virtue of 
this recognition it does not make sense for the privilege to be limited to only verbal expressions 
as a form of communication.486 While this may be a logical argument therein lies the difficulty 
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which even Barton487 recognises that is, if the privilege is taken to include all forms of 
communication then when and how does one draw the line? Barton488 suggests this may be 
done through one of two ways, the first by limiting the privilege to confidential 
communications only where the communicating spouse would have intended such 
communication to remain in confidence.489  
The second option is much like the current South African position, which is to include ‘any 
communication’ derived during the subsistence of the marriage.490 The American courts have 
adopted a restrictive approach, paying allegiance to the foundational principles of the privilege, 
they have maintained that, it is communications that would be to the detriment of the marriage 
that would always be excluded.491 There has been no uniform ruling by the courts regarding 
whether the physical appearance observed by one spouse in respect of the other can be regarded 
as communication that is privileged.492 Federal rules indicate that communication covers 
utterances and not acts.493 
In a more recent American case, that is perhaps closer to home, that of State of North Carolina 
v. Lesiba Simon Motsaoake494 the North Carolina appeal court found that tears shared between 
spouses were not protected by marital privilege. It was a case which brought the question of 
what constitutes confidential communication in terms of marital privilege into the spotlight. 
The accused was a South African citizen who was charged with rape committed in North 
Carolina. It is alleged that he committed the rape in 2003 but was only convicted in 2015. A 
sketch revealing his identikit was circulated in the local newspapers as investigators tried to 
find the suspect.495 His wife alleges that one day when they were driving in the car, the accused 
was reading the newspaper and when he saw the sketch of himself as a rape suspect in the paper 
he started to cry, and she saw a teardrop fall.496 The accused was extradited from South Africa 
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in 2012 and during the trial he raised the objection to his wife testifying as to evidence that he 
teared during the car ride, on the basis that this evidence was subject to marital privilege 
because it constituted confidential communication between him and his wife.497 The court 
disagreed with this argument and the accused spouses’ testimony was admitted into evidence. 
In reaching its decision the court took into account case law and statute in North Carolina, the 
court found that the accused tears did not constitute a confidential spousal communication.498 
The court stated that there was no conversation and therefore the accused could not have 
confided in his spouse, through the act of crying which was regarded as a reaction and not a 
definitive gesture in this case.499 The court did not pronounce on whether crying was a form of 
communication or not it merely stated that in this case the crying was not meant as a 
communication to the spouse due to it being a reaction by the accused to seeing a sketch of him 
in the newspaper.500 Which begs the question as to whether crying could be regarded as a form 
of communication where it is shown that through crying, a spouse intended to communicate 
confidentially with the other spouse and it was more than just a reaction. 
 
4.9 Limitations of marital privilege 
In the American jurisdiction, marital privilege is not absolute and therefore does not exist 
without exception.501 This normally arises in situations where the accused spouse is charged 
with an offence against the other spouse or their children.502 The exception in South African 
law can be found in a list of offences contained section 195 of the CPA503 and in American law 
it is catered for under the American Code of Evidence under 216504 which states the following, 
“Rule 216. Marital Privilege: Limitations”505 
“Neither of the spouses has a privilege under Rule 215 in 
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“(a) An action by one of them for annulment of marriage or for divorce or separation from the other, 
or for damages for the alienation of the affections of the other, or for criminal conversation with the 
other, or 
(b) An action for damages for injury done by one of them to the person or property of the other, 
including an action for wrongful death of the other, or 
(c) A criminal action in which one of them is charged with 
(i) A crime against the person or property of the other or of a child of either, or 
(ii) A crime against the person or property of a third person committed in the course of committing a 
crime against the other, or 
(iii) Bigamy or adultery, or 
(iv) Desertion of the other or of a child of either, or 
(d) A criminal action in which the accused offers evidence of a communication between him and his 
spouse.” 
The category of offences contained under American law is much broader than South Africa 
this is apparent from the provisions of Section C (ii) which extends protection to third parties 
and their property during the course of the attack on the spouse.506 This would be revolutionary 
if implemented in South African law considering the prevalence of violent attacks in a domestic 
scenario, as protection would go beyond merely a spouse and a child but also the extended 
family unit. A witness spouse should be compelled to divulge such information especially 
where a third party was violated by the accused spouse in an attempt to attack the testifying 
spouse. 
 
4.10 Conclusion 
The above discussion is by no means an extensive analysis of American law in respect of 
marital privilege as this would be a mammoth task and if one is truly to do justice would 
certainly be worthy of a study on its own. Though superficial it does seek to highlight elements 
in American law that are useful mechanisms in comparison to the statutory provisions related 
to marital privilege in South African law. Both jurisdictions have recognised the need to afford 
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marital communications a privilege to ensure the protection of a marital relationship and are at 
one with each other in this respect.507 
Divergence however rears its ugly head when it comes to the location of the privilege. In 
American law it is the spouse who makes the communication that is protected and in South 
African law the privilege is afforded to the spouse to whom the communication is made. It is 
submitted in support of Barton’s view that the holder of the privilege in South African law is 
misplaced.508 The spouse who made the communication has no control over what evidence the 
testifying spouse may divulge. The spouse who has made the communication has taken the 
other spouse into their confidence, that spouse should therefore have the power to prevent the 
confidentiality from being breached.509 It creates an anomalous situation as pointed out by 
Barton510 where the spouse who has not relied on the marital confidence at all but simply 
receives the communication is entitled to breach it.511 
The other notable difference between American and South African law as indicated in the 
preceding paragraphs is that South African legislation affords the privilege to ‘any 
communication’ as opposed to American law in which only ‘confidential communications are 
protected.512 Even in states where the American legislation makes reference to ‘any 
communication’ the court has taken a restrictive approach applying it only to communications 
made in confidence.513  
It cannot be disputed that American and South African law are at one with each other in respect 
of the policy justification for the existence of the privilege. In American law this justification 
will never change, as society upholds the protection of marital communications as sacrosanct. 
Although this remains the current position in South Africa, the future remains questionable. 
There are some notable divergences in the principles governing the operation of the privilege 
in these two countries. It is submitted that it is in the divergent roots of American law that 
South Africa can detect prominent and valuable resources that serve as starting points to 
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investigate the amendment of the current laws pertaining to marital privilege bringing it into 
alignment with the constitution. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
“… The fantastic spectacle of a fundamental rule of evidence, which never had a good reason for 
existence, surviving none the less through two centuries upon the strength of certain artificial dogmas-
pronouncement wholly reconcilable with each other, with the facts of life, and with the rule itself.” 
The mixed views that marital privilege has garnered over the years is best described by 
Wigmore514 in the quotation above. As this study reaches a conclusion it is quite clear that 
marital privilege is an ancient monolith that South Africa has inherited from our colonial 
history and has to be reformed in order to find its place in a post constitutional dispensation. 
This position is justified with the argument that the privilege exceeds its rationale, hampers the 
administration of justice by denying courts access to relevant information and is at odds with 
the right to equality in terms of the constitution. Of course those in support of the privilege rely 
on the argument that marriage is sacrosanct and therefore deserving of protection in order to 
preserve the marital harmony. This therefore necessitates a robust approach to reform marital 
privilege in order to achieve an equitable balance between ensuring the privilege is 
constitutionally sound and that people in unions are still able to confide in each other.  
The study of foreign jurisdictions reveal that the privilege has its roots firmly entrenched within 
the law. The English legal regime is regarded as the primary source from which South Africa 
has derived its application of marital privilege.515 Both the English and American legal systems 
have through the years produced extensive development in this area of the law.516 These 
countries have endorsed marital privilege through the common law and legislation.517 While 
countries such as Australia have indicated that the privilege does not exist in the common law, 
countries such as Hong Kong in recent years have recognised the importance of such a privilege 
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in the law of evidence and as a consequence thereof enacted provisions enforcing marital 
privilege within its legal system.518 
This however, cannot detract lawmakers from the fact that in South Africa there has been a 
social and politic evolution which necessitates the development of the common-law by 
interpreting the rules governing marital privilege more contextually, contemporarily and 
constitutionally. South African legislators cannot absolve themselves from this responsibility. 
However, this does not mean that South Africa should effect a complete abrogation of marital 
privilege, this is certainly not the ultimate solution. There are compelling arguments that 
suggest that such a privilege is of paramount importance in the preservation of a marital 
relationship.519 
Case law and academic commentaries reveal that this contentious area of law is embedded 
within our criminal justice system. Historical developments and comparative authorities 
referred to in this study suggest there are valid grounds for the reformation of marital privilege.  
In order to remedy the current constitutional dilemma marital privilege presents, it would 
require recommendations that would reform statute in order to align the privilege with 
constitutional norms and standards. 
It is submitted that the preceding chapters have provided the basis for the reconsideration of 
the rules governing marital privilege.   
 
5.2 Recommendations 
Naude520 suggests three viable options, the first that marital privilege should be abolished while 
still allowing the witness spouse the decision on whether to testify or not, the exception would 
be where the accused spouse has been charged with an offence contained in Section 195.521 
This is an option that leaves the current position unchanged and therefore does not add much 
weight to the discussion on reforming the privilege. 
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In order to stay relevant to the modern context, the privilege should be extended to include 
other categories of relationships that do not conform to the conventional notion of a 
marriage.522 These of course would include co-habitants as well as couples that have chosen 
not to enter into a marriage or cannot legally enter into a marriage. The difficulty in 
implementing such an extension arises with the task of defining such relationships.523 This 
would be arduous in that courts would have to define relationships that function as a 
marriage.524 This would force the court to go through a factual enquiry in order to assess the 
relationship.525 This would be based on questions such as the length of the relationship, whether 
the couple are living together or not, their financial dependence on each other.526 In addition 
the prosecution would face the laborious task of facing confrontation by countless couples who 
do not want to give evidence until the court has pronounced on whether their relationship is 
afforded protection by the privilege.527 This would certainly place an enormous strain on the 
South African judicial system. It would also undermine criminal proceedings which as Naude 
points out may not be the arena for the evaluation of relationships to ascertain their 
functionality as a marriage.528 Despite these points of criticism it is submitted that in order to 
remedy the inequality that currently exists through the operation of the privilege however 
difficult it may be for the courts to adapt this approach it is not impossible and will be required 
for the proper administration of justice. 
The second option is to render spouses the same as all other category of witnesses and in 
addition, as Naude suggests allow the court the discretion to pardon spouses when it is not in 
the public interest that they be compelled to testify.529 This is the most flexible approach. It 
seeks to balance the interests of justice with the interests of society.530 The law has always 
allowed witnesses a concession not to testify where that witness has a just excuse.531 This is 
specifically provided for in section 189 of the Criminal Procedure Act which recognises that 
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in certain situations it is undesirable to force a witness to give evidence.532  The court defined 
‘just excuse in Attorney-General, Transvaal v Kader 533as more than a lawful excuse stating 
that each case had to be assessed on its merits taking into account section 189. Essentially it 
appears to require a balancing act between the public interest in having access to all relevant 
evidence and the disadvantage suffered by the witness forced to testify.534 
What would constitute a ‘just excuse’ for a spouse who does not wish to testify? Naude535 puts 
forth the following considerations that a court must take into account when making this 
determination, 
     “1. The probable probative value of the evidence; 
2. The seriousness of the offence; 
3. The disruption of any continuing relationship; 
4. The harshness of compelling the person to testify; 
5. The availability of other evidence on the same matters and the reliability of such evidence; 
6. The likelihood that harm would be caused to the testifying spouse; 
7. whether, in giving the evidence, the spouse would have to disclose matter that was received in 
confidence from the accused; and 
8. Whether the application for exemption is made freely and independent of a threat or    improper 
influence.”536 
This option does indeed appear enticing but is not without blemishes; the first is that by 
allowing the spouse to rely on the ‘just excuse’ not to testify one could create the impression 
that it is the spouse that has the discretion and not the court.537 In order to dispel this fear the 
court would have to adopt a strict approach in its application of discretion.538 The other 
criticism lends itself to the fact that the prosecution would be faced with much uncertainty as 
the prosecutor would not know beforehand whether the spouse would be compellable or not 
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this would affect the timeous and proper preparation of the case by the prosecutor.539 Although 
commendable this option still does not remedy the gap that exists whereby section 198 still 
excludes other forms of relationships thereby advancing inequality and this option does not 
take cognisance of this factor.  
The last option is to remove marital privilege from South African law completely thereby 
forcing spouses to be competent and compellable with no room for exception.540 This would 
remedy the situation where the privilege appears to be operating in conflict with the 
Constitution but would not do much for the protection of communications between couples. 
It would create equality amongst all categories of relationships and witnesses.  However, it 
begs the question as to whether this may be the best solution. Naude argues this is an inflexible 
approach and is not desirable when one analyses the controversial nature of spousal testimony 
in the first place, in an area of the law where it is difficult to adopt a hard and fast approach.541 
The writer is in support of this view the defects in the law surrounding marital privilege cannot 
be cured through a rigid approach. This would be difficult to enforce without opposition from 
different sectors of society and could raise many issues in a diverse country such as South 
Africa where there are a wide array of societal norms and standards. 
When one compares the right to equality with the right to marry it is discernible that section 9 
of the Constitution dictates that marital privilege is unconstitutional. In light of this if credence 
is to be given to our Constitution than marital privilege must be reformed without delay.542 It 
is submitted that this can only be achieved through an amendment of section 198 of the CPA543 
and not a total abandonment of the privilege. It is humbly recommended that in order to remedy 
the problems discussed in this study section 198 should be replaced with a provision that reads 
as follows: 
No person who is deemed to be in a ‘marital relationship’ or any other union for which they 
may be regarded as being in such relationship for all intents and purposes as determined by the 
court, is a compellable witness against the other in that same relationship, in respect of any 
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confidential communications made to him or her during the subsistence of the relationship 
unless, 
• The person who made such communication consents. 
• The marriage has not been terminated. 
• The communication is intended to be confidential. 
• The court deems that it is in the interests of justice that such witness testifies. 
This provision confers the privilege upon the accused spouse. It makes concession for other 
forms of relationships by bestowing upon the courts a discretion to determine whether a 
relationship meets all the elements of a marital relationship. Each case to be determined on its 
own merits. The provision also limits the privilege to confidential communication only and 
removes the privilege upon termination of the marriage as there is no marital relationship that 
remains at risk.  In so doing the recommended provision may be able to achieve a more accurate 
balance between safeguarding the marital relationship, giving effect to the truth-seeking 
process and ensuring that the constitution is not violated. 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
Within our constitutional dispensation it is becoming increasingly difficult to justify the 
existence of an outdated illogical privilege that is currently in violation of the supreme law of 
our land. The privilege in its current form is a contradiction; on the one hand it purports to 
protect the marital relationship and yet on the other extends the privilege to divorced and 
separated persons where the marriage has been terminated. It at times detracts from the ends of 
justice by perpetuating inequality on the basis of marital status. If the Constitution is to be taken 
seriously than South African lawmakers must effect an amendment of the current provisions 
governing marital privilege. While the future of marital privilege in South African law maybe 
shrouded in uncertainty there is one thing we know for sure and that is as put by The South 
African law reform commission544 ‘The constitutional right of equality before the law requires 
a re-consideration of marital privilege.’545 
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